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We insist upon “green space”, but the term’s vague cast brings little into focus. In this thesis I 
search out what it is that we look for in green space. I consider some ways, within our North 
American context, that we interact with it, represent it, speak about it and write about it. 
Drawing together evidence from a diverse range of  sources in myth and mapping, poetry, 
classical philosophy, feminist theory, language, and personal experience, I find enigmatic but 
persistent geometries of  desire binding us to the notion of  green space. 
These desires for green space manifest themselves in relationships of  practical dependence, 
imaginative dependence, violence, and love. But most of  all green space is at work, wherever it 
emerges, at the core of  our becoming-other. 
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This thesis springs from many beginnings. Two stand out sharply. 
One is a canola field in bloom that I encountered one drizzling morning, while cycling through 
rural Finland. Its plane of yellow-green flower heads seemed to fluoresce in the grey atmo-
sphere, and the way that they floated on descending stalks elicited a spectral greenness of limit-
less depth. That shocking, thick colour has remained with me always. 
A second point of departure was my discovery, some summers ago, of an otherwise non-distinc-
tive parkette in Montreal that had, in a rare gesture, been named after a feminist. Through luck, 
that act of naming opened for me a new world of thought. 
When I returned to that Montreal neighbourhood, some years later, to remind myself of the 
parkette’s name and nakesake, I found instead a building being constructed in its place. 
And who could say what is happening in that Finnish field?
PREAMBLE

When green space is mapped as a political condition, it appears as polygons of  nature preserve 
or city park, perhaps neatly divided from city or suburb; or as sections of  explicitly purposed 
rural lands, or lands reserved from development. Sometimes green spaces are given names. 
They may be private or public or both, or ownership may be unclear. They may be openly ac-
cessible, or access may be limited to particular interests (such as military or scientific research), 
or according to factors like money, mobility, time of  day, or season. These familiar models com-
partmentalize and categorize green spaces, setting them apart within negotiated margins. They 
offer a picture of  those specific parcels of  “green” land whose identities and borders are (at least 
provisionally) documented, declared, and fixed. If  the word for “garden” derives from notions 
of  enclosure—describing a delineated, vegetated space that is set apart—then in a broad sense 
these parcelled green spaces follow in the garden’s wake. 
But besides these formal green spaces, which can be mapped with some certainty and with 
clearly-surveyed edges, there are those casual or accidental green spaces that elude any such 
sharp representation. Often nameless and declaring no permanent footprint on the landscape, 
informal green spaces emerge at edges and peripheries, transitional or marginal zones. As 
Michel Serres identifies in his book Detachment, they take up “the fringe, the fuzzy area, the 
refuse, the wasteland, the open-space.” And despite—or more correctly, because of—their 
nebulous identities, Serres identifies that these marginal and peripheral spaces are crucial to 
the Western experience of  landscapes. Indeed, their cultural importance cannot be overstated: 
he muses that, as malleable spaces of  potential, they are responsible for engendering our sense 
of  history and time. It is in “that little bushy grove, that humid low tract through which we 
wade awkwardly or that abandoned field with weeds and little thickets of  low bushes, all these 
deserted fields” that he finds the locus of  our wisdom. Unassuming, awkward and abandoned, 
overgrown or underdeveloped, these wildly vegetative spaces are the somewhat-forbidding but 
appropriable territories of  Earth’s celebrated surplus. Their presence—their texture—provides 
  European, Indo-European, and Slavic languages derive their words for “garden” from words signifying “enclosure”, 
including garden (gard - twigs) and paradise (pairidaeza, compound of pairi- “around” + diz “to make, form (a wall).”) John 
Dixon Hunt. Greater Perfections, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 9-20.
2  Michel Serres. “China Loam” in Detachment, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 989), 5.
  Ibid., 8-9.
  Ibid., 7.
5  Ibid., 9. 
intRoduction

us with a reassurance that “something remains for an upcoming project.” That they are spaces 
outside of  control and often outside of  consciousness, spaces outside the grip of  civilization 
itself, is an old idea: our word “forest” derives from the Latin foris, meaning outside. In an even 
more ancient formulation, we find that the Greek word meaning “wood” or “forest”, hyle, is 
re-appropriated by Aristotle as the name for “matter”: the raw substance of  chaotic stuff  that 
unites with form (morphe) to make “things.” “We push our goats toward the brushwood,” Serres 
says, quite perfectly describing our stubborn inclination to press ever toward new territories and 
to make use of  the resources they offer. But indeed, he affirms, we depend on the “brushwood” 
not only as goatherds. We also rely on it for the sense of  possibility that it promises, the air that 
it allows in, the claustrophobia that it alleviates—whether or not we ever make physical use of  
it, bring it under control, or attempt to use it up. 
While I have set apart these two typologies of  green space—that which stems from the garden 
and that which stems from the forest—that vegetative space that is “under control” inside the 
fence and that found “out of  control” outside of  it—they cannot, in fact, be sharply divided. 
Nancy McKinnon, a Canadian architect and writer, notes that as the notion of  “green space” 
has swallowed up that of  “garden”, its vague territories have also digested the garden’s particu-
lar value and meaning:
The garden initially representing an “accommodation” between rationality and spirit, offering to the indi-
vidual a place to express the spirit, a loosening, has become “green space,” the very words suggesting a lack of  
value and meaning, the need only for something green regardless of  what it is.10
Even in this criticism, however, McKinnon hints that green space possesses some seemingly 
irreducible and mysterious value. For it fulfills a certain “need only for something green,” even 
“something green regardless of  what it is.” Here, McKinnon’s observation raises some critical 
questions. What is it that this indistinct “something green” seems to promise? What do we feel 
we need from that which is green; what do we want it for?
Loose and multihued, contradictory and unstable, we find green space occupying heartlands 
and haphazardly filling margins. It emerges bidden or not, controlled or not. It is variously 
championed, overlooked and wasted, and—as Serres hints—easily underestimated.
  Serres, “China Loam,” 9. 
7  Robert Pogue Harrison, Forests : The Shadow of Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 992), .
8  Ibid., 28. 
9  Serres, 9. 
0  Nancy McKinnon, “The Issue of Control in the Contemporary Urban Frontier : Swimming in the Sea,” in Feminist 
Reconstruction of Space, ed. Louise May (St. Norbert, Man.: St. Norbert Arts and Cultural Centre, 2000), 0. 
GREEN : 
 – adjective
not dried, cured, seasoned, or otherwise 
prepared for use: green tobacco.
recent; fresh; new: a green wound.
Once in a while
we’d find a patch
of yellow violets
not many
but blue big blue
ones in
the cemetery woods
we’d pick
bunches of them
there was a family
named Foltette
a big family
with lots of children’s graves
so we’d take
bunches of violets
and place one
on each headstone1 
William Carlos Williams. “The Children”  in Pictures from Brueghel and other poems (New York: New Directions Publishing 
Corp, 92), 2.  
THE CHILDREN

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GREEN :
 - adjective
easily fooled; easy to trick or cheat.
 - noun
greens (plural): fresh leaves or branches 
of trees, shrubs, etc., used for decoration; 
wreaths.

One spring the frost left the ground and the lawns greened up until they oozed emerald. Not 
ours. I watched it fade for days until its lifelessness became as singular as the neighbour’s 
perfect green plane.  
“There were so many weeds that I decided to just start over,” my landlord explained, as absolute 
as lawn. What a phrase, to start over. It draws a thick black line in time and draws the future 
over the past like a curtain. It sees the hand poised over the now straw-coloured canvas, ready 
to lay down new verdant hues. It clamours out as a euphemism to muffle the eerie crunch of 
dead vegetation in spring. 
The Greek root of the word euphemism is “eu” + “pheme”, meaning well-speaking., We most 
often think of it as a tool for speaking gently about a rough matter: a minced word, a polite-
ness or political correctness, a deliberate softening of a scene to render it more palatable to 
conversation. We have invented a remarkable number of euphemisms to dilute descriptions of 
death and erasure, brutal delicacies that we place over the sharp edges of mortality to shield 
the tender sensibilities of a listener. But a euphemism can also function as a linguistic guard 
for the speaker. In this case, its practice of well-speaking is a hedge against the potentially bad 
consequence of uttering a negative word. In ancient Greek tradition the Erinyes are given the 
epithet Eumenides, or “pleasant ones” in a gesture to woo the vengeful goddesses to favour., 
The point of this conciliation remains plain. When we are concerned for our good fortune, we 
still take care to name things well, willing to at least play along with the notion that there may 
be a material relationship between the nature of things and what they are called. Well-speak-
ing is a rose glass. Whether it is set before the listener or the speaker, it recasts the world in a 
warmer tone. And as it changes the light that falls on the object in view, does it not alter the 
object as well?
 “euphemism.” Online Etymology Dictionary. Douglas Harper, Historian. accessed 2 April 200, http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/euphemism.
2 “eu.” Online Etymology Dictionary. Douglas Harper, Historian. accessed 2 April 200, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/eu.
 J.D. Sadler. “Weasel-Words, Weasels, Woodpeckers, Et Al,” The Classical Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2: , accessed 2 April 200, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/29582.
 Matthew S. McGlone and Jennifer A. Batchelor, “Looking Out for Number One: Euphemism and Face,” The Journal of 
Communication, Vol 5, No. 2, pp. 25-2, 200, accessed 2 April 200, http://dx.doi.org/0./j.0-2.200.
tb02589.x


The red glass, says Goethe, exhibits a bright landscape in so dreadful a hue as to inspire senti-
ments of awe. But in time, I lost track of where we had stood that day on the crackling lawn, 
just looking through those sharp words “start over”. There were new dustings of soil, seed, 
fertilizer. Gradually green tips crept in. For a while the old surface of thatch sat in a crumpled 
pile at the curb.
By midsummer, those reupholstered margins between house and street and sidewalk again 
bristled wholly green. Perhaps, I softened, there had been no euphemism here. Perhaps starting 
over is simply one of the things that a green space is for.
5  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Theory of Colours, trans. Sir Charles Lock Eastlake, (London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 97), 
5. 
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green : 
- noun 
(foundry)
(of sand) sufficiently moist to form a 
compact lining for a mold without further 
treatment
(of a casting) as it comes from the mold
15
becoming-formwork:
matter to be taken up and used now, 
ready now;
grains clinging together in weak bonds.
grains that (will) nest together,
capable of  taking provisional form,
provisionally structural. 
matter that can be worked to inscribe a void.
formable matter (that may be) used to produce an imprint, 
a negative, a formwork, a vessel 
for now.
of a casting : 
becoming-form:
 
the casting as it is lifted from the (now, no longer green) sand; 
a provisional quality of  this cast form or object as long as 
it is damp or rough or new
 
of sand : 
16
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0 2  :  E r o s
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green: 
- noun 
a colour intermediate in the spectrum between yellow 
and blue, an effect of light with a wavelength between 
500 and 570 nm; 
found in nature as the colour of most grasses and 
leaves while growing, of some fruits while ripening, 
and of the sea.
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What is green? This definition gathers together three descriptions. It stages leaps from one facet 
of  green to another, reading as though three voices speak in turn. Each voice, brandishing its 
unique set of  tools, brings a fresh image into view. The voices are those of  a cartographer, a 
hunter, and a lover. 
Green [is] a colour intermediate in the spectrum between yellow and blue, an effect of  light with a wavelength 
between 500 and 570 nm; 
The cartographer speaks first, revealing green by mapping it. She marks it out according to its 
borders: its approximated margins along the spectral bleed of  visible light, and the territories 
(yellow and blue) that lie outside of  it. She finds out its quantity and scale. 
Green [is] a colour . . .  found in nature as the colour of most grasses and leaves while growing, of some 
fruits while ripening . . . 
The next observation has the tone of  a naturalist, an explorer—one who discovers what is green 
by way of  a hunt. “I spy,” the children’s game declares, “something that is green”—and the 
hunter looks out after it. He finds the greens of  growing things and unripe fruits to be familiar 
phenomena: at least sometimes ubiquitous, if  scattered at other times, and inevitably prone to 
emergence, disappearance, and interruption. His description does not form a coherent terri-
tory that can be encircled with a sharp line; rather, its greens can only be captured as with a 
net which, passing in a moment through the air, entraps some things and allows others to slip 
through. 
Green [is] . . . the colour . . . of  the sea. 
The third voice speaks with the singular focus of  someone in love. To remark (only, simply) that 
the sea is green is to speak from a position of  immersion, to float in greenness, insensible to 
where its sensation might end in space or time. To see only the sea’s greenness is to risk becom-
ing stranded in it. For the lover green stretches out all around, as far as the eye can see. 
finding green
26
An example Greenness Map of North America from the EROS website. The red square (my addition) indicates the 
approximate location of the EROS facility, which is centrally-located on the continent near Sioux Falls, South Dakota. 
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The colour green often appears on maps as the shades of  nature preserves or parks, or to indicate 
land with a vegetative covering. In these cases it stands for rough blocks of  land where non-hu-
man processes predominate, or for areas where vegetation maintains a dominant footprint. But 
lost to these conventional mapping approaches are those informal green realms: those spaces 
where vegetative processes coexist with various built conditions, where they stage incidental or 
cyclical emergences, disappearances, elaborations, and witherings.
But there is an ongoing mapping project by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) that 
seeks to represent just these nuances: the way that greenness, as an ever-shifting quantity, occupies 
the landscape at large. The “Greenness Map” is produced by USGS EROS (Earth Resources 
Observation and Science) to register the vigour and extent of  the earth’s vegetative covering; in 
their words “the quantity of  actively photosynthesizing biomass on the landscape.” Greenness 
is measured using satellite imaging: with an Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer 
(AVHRR) that is continually aloft aboard a weather satellite, EROS captures snapshots of  solar 
radiation as it is reflected back from the earth’s surface. Red light (580-680 nm) is absorbed in 
highest quantities by the liveliest chlorophyll-laden leaves. Near-infrared radiation (725-1100 
nm) is reflected by the healthy, spongy-mesophyll layer in leaf  structures. By tracking the quan-
tity of  radiation reflected in these ranges, an image of  vegetation health, or Greenness Map, can 
be generated. At a glance, its radiometric image resembles an aerial photograph. 
EROS produces weekly and biweekly Greenness Maps of  the United States (and sometimes of  
other land regions as well.) Since greenness data for the United States has been collected since 
1989, maps can also be produced to show the “departure from average greenness” for any given 
week. Another analysis of  the data shows “relative greenness;” that is, how the current green-
ness level of  any particular place compares to its maximum greenness potential. Relative green-
ness calculations acknowledge that the greenness potential of  lush New England, for example, 
is different than that of  arid Nevada. 
The Maps show mottled, shifting masks of  green that ripple over the American landscape. 
Some areas appear intensely green, some desaturated, others register only a hint of  verdure. But 
  “Greenness of the Coterminous US,” USGS, accessed 25 april 202, http://ivm.cr.usgs.gov/index.php.
mapping greenness
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Greenness Maps for the week of August 9 202, captured from EROS’s interactive online viewer. 
 The following series of maps zooms in toward the EROS site at Sioux Falls.
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clear across America, the Maps say, green is the rule. Contemplating the intensity with which 
we inhabit the landscape—with cities and suburbs, highways and shopping centres, airports 
and strip mines—this is a surprising imaginative leap.2 It is astonishing to consider that it is pos-
sible (or meaningful, or useful) to picture the land solely in terms of  its greenness. Dwelling in 
these landscapes, it seems that there are enough places that are not verdant at all that to represent 
America as one vast, varied green space would be a fragmentary project at best. But here are the 
canvasses that proclaim green’s totalizing reach. There may be more to the landscape, the Maps 
say, but greenness is everywhere. In this August series, the only areas that register as entirely 
“not green” are the patches of  cloud caught floating between the satellite and the earth. During 
winter and spring, incandescently-reflective snow-fields are the other notable landscape that 
reports no greenness values.  
What are these maps getting at? EROS explains their purpose:
The greenness maps are used by government agencies and private industry for a wide variety of  applications. 
Some examples are agricultural assessment, grazing land management, grassland and forest fire danger as-
sessment, and drought monitoring.
The Maps, then, capture green’s fluctuating value as a natural resource for the interests of  land 
management: in each of  these readings, green stands for abundance. It promises good crops and 
profitable pasturelands. It is also valuable as a kind of  organic insurance policy against various 
natural catastrophes; and like a coal-mine canary, alerting us to imminent overturnings in the 
landscape. The Maps are a kind of  early warning system to help us anticipate and manage these 
natural threats. 
With these gravities in mind, it is easy to understand the Map’s frequent (weekly) iterations. The 
images become weighty: forest-coloured tracts seem promising and comforting, while dull spots 
are disquieting. The lack of  permanence of  each successive image cuts with a double edge. 
On one hand, the greenness (lushness) that we count on to sustain and protect us could, at any 
time, begin to slip away. On the other hand, the Maps harbour hope: if  there is already some 
amount of  greenness everywhere, then with a few more trees, or a little more rain, we could see 
2  Another description of the colours of the earth from above, appearing in Anne W. Spirn’s book The Granite Garden, 
provides an interesting counterpoint: “Seen from space, the earth is a garden world, a planet of life, a sphere of blues and 
greens sheathed in a moist atmosphere. ... blue seas and green forests and grasslands emerge, surrounding and penetrating 
the vast urban constellations. Even from this great distance above the earth, the cities are a gray mosaic premeated by 
tendrils and specks of green, the large rivers and great parks within them. (3-4)
3 “Greenness of the Coterminous US,” USGS, accessed 25 april 202, http://ivm.cr.usgs.gov/index.php.
30
The greenness of the Earth’s surface is given as an amount of reflected solar radiation, 
measured from a distance of thousands of kilometres away.
3
it increase. Perhaps, the Maps seem to suggest, in this expansive green space that we aim to tend 
and keep, we may not be so far from the Garden after all: a walk in its shade in the cool of  the 
day seems within our reach.
However, trying to lose ourselves in the shade of  the Greenness Map’s garden is no easy task. To 
start with, the Map gives no indication of  where to find the shade. Since greenness is captured 
from above, what is registered is just the uppermost layer of  vegetation: that rare, thin surface 
of  matter that touches the sky. We can never be sure if  we are looking at a carpet or a canopy, or 
an impenetrably dense volume of  vegetation like a cornfield or tangled scrub. It seems intuitive 
to imagine that the darkest greens would represent deep forests; but the reference for extreme 
greenness values, EROS explains, is instead likely to be an alfalfa field in the climax of  its 
growth.4
In this way, the Map upheaves expected topographies of  greenness, placing us in an entirely 
new terrain. It builds a kind of  looking-glass world whose unexpected features and instabilities 
are both unsettling, and exciting, seductive. Rather than the compartmentalizing, strictly spatial 
chartings of  green space with which we are most familiar, it suggests a borderless greenness that 
swells and recedes, that can billow like a cloud or wither and dissipate. 
This way of  thinking about greenness as a quality bound irrevocably to time conjures more 
clearly the way that we experience green in our landscapes. It calls to mind the swift transfor-
mations that can catch our breath: the hot spring day that forces leaves to burst from bud, the 
sudden hail storm that pulverizes crops, the way that a field can seem to sprout all at once as if  
on cue. It also conjures the slow changes, such as the the subtly-shifting hues in the tree canopy 
from the greens of  spring to those of  late-summer. 
But in fact, the dimensions of  green’s liveliness in time are rather loosely-rendered in the 
Greenness Maps. The Maps, as we have noted, are produced only in weekly or bi-weekly in-
tervals. Furthermore, each Map is assembled as a collaged, composite image, knitted together 
from the most cloud-free snapshots captured over the given period of  study. Setting aside the 
practical conditions that must determine the pace of  the Greenness Map’s production—such 
as the schedule for mapping that is functional for fire marshalls and reasonable for the research 
institution—the Maps provoke questions about the measurement of  greenness’s temporality. 
What is the appropriate unit of  time for measuring changes in greenness? Or perhaps—is it 
4  “Conterminous United States Forecasted Fire Potential,” USGS, accessed 25 april 202, http://ivm.cr.usgs.gov/viewer/
metadata/FPI-FP_meta.xml
32
Each pixel is equal to one square kilometre.
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reasonable to consider all types and transformations of  greenness according to a single unit of  
time? 
And what of  its unit in space? To make the Map, greenness is calculated by measuring reflected 
radiation: in this frame of  reference, it is a quantity appraised in nanometers. At another scale, 
greenness is given as vegetative health, or the general condition of  plants in a region. How big 
is a region of  greenness? Zooming in, we see that the Maps are in fact coarsely gridded. This 
graphic patterning is an effect of  the radiometer’s resolution, which pixelates the landscape into 
1x1 kilometre squares; in other words, it registers an average greenness value over each square 
kilometre of  land area. Finally, embedded in the map’s processes is another leap of  scale: green-
ness data is collected by orbiting satellites from a distance of  thousands of  kilometres away.
Among the Map’s collage of  scales–its overlay of  the imperceptibly minute and the impalpably 
big—the value of  greenness becomes dizzyingly abstract. Indeed, as it is derived across multiple 
orders of  space and several different times, it is hard to say exactly what we are seeing in the 
Map’s rough pixels. Within its schema, all landforms except the very large are blurred to the 
point of  erasure. Its gros-grain approach to picturing greenness is blunt; and its effects, likewise, 
are blunting. 
It is striking that the greenness depicted in the Map is nothing that we can bring up against our 
senses, our bodies, or the scale of  our experience—everything familiar in the landscape, even 
the relentless gesture of  the Jeffersonian grid, is subsumed by the satellite’s arbitrary geometry. 
But what the Map sets out to quantify, as we have seen, is greenness’s value as a resource. In par-
ticular it seeks to determine, for the sake of  managing greenness, the ways that living vegetation 
might fail us: where its weaknesses might bring about hardship, destruction, or economic loss 
if  it is overcome by drought or fire. The Map’s portrait, then, interposes itself  between us and 
greenness; between our senses and the sharp edges of  these green catastrophes. The remark-
able organizing figure that it strikes on the landscape, superceding even the rigour of  the grid, 
smoothes over the complexities of  the living landscape that we inhabit. It regularizes differences 
and changes, appearing to mitigate the threats of  green space—and likewise, dampening its 
myriad effects. 
Amid our increasingly unstable environment, with its shifting climatic and weather conditions, 
the Map’s standardizing rubric offers a pacifying promise: since any future transformations of  
greenness can be interpreted according to its existing system, variations automatically appear to 
be matters of  degree, and never of  kind. Anything new in greenness can be interpreted by the 
34
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Map’s algorithms; any future conditions will be representable using its existing tools. At least in 
our near future—whatever occurs next month, or in the next few years—seems “under control” 
in the sense that it is rendered directly comparable to our information about greenness’s present 
and past. In this sense, the Map tempers the future’s potential to surprise us, or to bring about 
new things that we cannot understand or incorporate in our current models. This aggressive 
softening of  greenness’s complexity and unpredictability seems to mute the force of  greenness, 
dulling its apparent capacity for change. 
From its position of  remove, with its touch out-of-touch, the Greenness Map project wields a 
refiguring influence on the landscape, reconstructing and restraining the phenomena of  living 
and dying vegetation. As such, it stands for much more than its masses of  accumulated data and 
estranging images. The Map is a compelling piece in the relationship between humanity and 
greenness: a complex relationship characterized, as we have begun to explore, by curiousity, 
dependance, anxiety, and hierarchy. The Map makes of  the landscape a wild chess match where 
we two are at play—and not all in fun. Through the long arm of  its aerial view it reaches out to 
understand, but also to mediate and control the oscillations of  greenness in the landscape. 
Setting aside for a moment the particular parameters of  the Greenness Map project, and what-
ever ways its portraits satisfy or frustrate, it is the role that the Map inhabits in our relationship 
to greenness that demands further inquiry. Where do its cartographic processes place us relative 
to the greenness that we seek to quantify and evaluate? How closely can such a map allow us 
to approach an understanding of  green space? To find some answers, we will turn away from 
the particular content of  the Greenness Map, and instead consider cartographic processes in 
general: the particular agencies produced by the constellations and geometries that are inherent 
in its modes of  seeing. 
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Remnant Ridges across the Grid; Reynolds, North Dakota,  by Alex S. McLean.
“. . . the Jeffersonian grid, projected unconditionally over the open territories of the western United States is at 
once a symbol of democratic equality and an expedient means to manage vast quantites of territory; an attempt 
to impose measure on the immeasurable.”  
 - Stan Allen, From Object to Field. accessed 6 February 203, http://crisisfronts.wikispaces.com/Readings.
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flight can be exhilarating
It is no surprise that the Greenness Map, like most maps, reports an aerial view. Before satellites 
gathered data for aerial imaging there was the airplane; before these came the hot-air balloon, 
which was famously used to capture the first aerial photos of  Paris in 1858.5 Preceeding any 
flight technology, it was common to climb a tower or a tall hill to gain a chorographic bird’s-
eye view of  a town or region. And finally, barring the availability of  any of  these direct aerial 
vistas, the imagination—whether furnished with the aid of  cartographic tools or not—has put 
forth aerial representations of  the world since the earliest maps we know. We are used to aerial 
vantage points and imagery.6
In his book Taking Measures Across the American Landscape, a visually stunning collection of  map-
ping and aerial imagery made in collaboration with photographer Alex McLean, James Corner 
writes about the powerful agency exercised by the aerial view in America’s landscapes. He ex-
plains the particular strengths of  the aerial view or aerial representation: those qualities which, 
in his estimation, recommend it as the “best” method to picture and transform the surface of  
the earth. 
He begins by speaking about the experience of  airplane flight:  
[Flight] can be exhilarating, for even the most seasoned pilot, especially in a small plane, from which land-
scapes unfold with kaleidoscopic grandeur. When one flies close to the ground, horizons, topographies, colors, 
textures, and gravities shift and turn in unexpected and breathtaking ways.7
This aerial perspective reads like an amusement park ride, an exercise for revelling in physical 
and visual surprise as the senses lurch to take in the scene. But a moment later, when he is high 
above the earth and the plane has levelled out, Corner declares that the landscape is “revealed 
5  Charles Waldheim. “Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape” in Recovering Landscape, ed. James Corner. 
(New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 999), 22.
6  Denis Cosgrove’s book Apollo’s Eye provides an exhaustive account of the history of the Apollonian (singular, 
transcendent) gaze.
  James Corner, “Aerial Representation and the Making of Landscape” in Taking Measures Across the American Landscape, 
(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 996),5.
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Large Pivot Irrigators, by Alex S. McLean
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with detached and analytical clarity.”8 Viewing the earth from above, he says, one gains the 
ability “to see and conceive large regions ... with rational and comprehensive understanding.”9 
How then can we characterise the aerial view?10 One moment it is a spinning kaleidoscope, 
unexpected and breathtaking; the next moment its coloured tiles fall into a flat order and ap-
pear to offer a dispassionate, coherent perspective. Ultimately, Corner asserts, it is the “synoptic 
rationality” of  the aerial view that is most important, and that renders it the best perspective 
from which to read and write the built environment. Somehow, his experience of  sensory 
engagement becomes one of  cerebral detachment as he glides over the landscape—and the 
levelling-out of  the place does not account for such an overturning of  perspective. Instead, the 
perceptual shift that we see here is primarily internal: a movement of  his mind. 
In his epic Prelude—though precipitated by different circumstances—William Wordsworth 
describes the same kind of  mental inversion that Corner seems to experience. In the poem, 
Wordsworth is walking distractedly through the streets of  London when he finds himself  startled 
out of  his reverie. He is suddenly overcome by the sight 
Of  a blind Beggar, who, with upright face, 
Stood propped against a wall, upon his chest 
Wearing a written paper, to explain 
The story of  the man, and who he was.”12
The blind man and his sign give Wordsworth a kind of  terror, in response to which he feels his 
mind perform a twist: 
My mind did at this spectacle turn round 
As with the might of  waters
  Corner, “Aerial Representation,” 5.
9  Corner, “Aerial Representation,” 5.
10  Corner’s contradictory characterization of flight seems to echo le Corbusier’s. The latter says of the Bird’s Eye View 
in his book Aircraft: “The eye now sees in substance what the mind formerly could only subjectively conceive. / It is a new 
function added to our senses. / It is a new standard of measurement. / It is a new basis of sensation. “ (Corbusier, 123) But 
while for Corbusier the airplane reveals and indicts, and provides a new (superhuman) scale, I read his characterization of 
the flight experience as sensory through and through. It is alienating to the familiar human scale, but in contrast to Corner, 
never “detached”. 
  Corner, “Aerial Representation,” 5.
2  William Wordsworth. The Prelude: or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind; an Autobiographical Poem, London and Literature in the 
9th Century: Cardiff University, accessed 0/24/3, http://www.cf.ac.uk/encap/skilton/restrict/wworth02.html. 
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And once, far-travelled in such mood, beyond
The reach of  common indications, lost
Amid the moving pageant, ’twas my chance
Abruptly to be smitten with the view
Of  a blind Beggar, who, with upright face,
Stood propped against a wall, upon his chest
Wearing a written paper, to explain
The story of  the man, and who he was.
My mind did at this spectacle turn round
As with the might of  waters, and it seemed
To me that in this label was a type,
Or emblem, of  the utmost that we know,
Both of  ourselves and of  the universe;
And, on the shape of  the unmoving man,
His fixèd face and sightless eyes, I looked
As if  admonished from another world.
Though reared upon the base of  outward things,
These, chiefly, are such structures as the mind
Builds for itself; . . . 
 - excerpt from William Wordsworth, The Prelude: or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind; an Autobiographical Poem.
4
At that instant, Wordsworth no longer sees the beggar with his sign as a man making a personal 
plea; but rather, perceives him as a poetic symbol for humanity’s general state of  blindness in 
the universe. 
The alternate title to Wordsworth’s poem is Growth of  a Poet’s Mind; an Autobiographical Poem. In the 
next stanza, he muses upon the poetic utility of  his experience, describing how the poet’s mind 
translates such a scene into a poetic image: 
Though reared upon the base of  outward things,
These, chiefly, are such structures as the mind
Builds for itself  1
One moment the blind man startles him; the next moment, Wordsworth sees his mind recon-
struct his vision in more abstract terms, building on top of  its general shape a thing that he can 
use. This mental inversion and reinterpretation of  the scene is a typical example of  Wordsworth’s 
Romantic sublime.4 In his rendering, the sublime occurs when the poetic mind—and more 
broadly, the human mind—executes this kind of  rereading or reconfiguration of  an event to 
gain “mastery over an experience that had seemed overwhelming.”5 
Recalling Corner’s flight experience, we can see a likeness to the cerebral reconstruction that 
Wordsworth describes. It is through the mind’s ability to give an intelligible structure to an 
overwhelming scene that Corner is able to reinterpret the kaleioscopic landscape as a rational 
image, and to feel in the place of  his original sense of  vertigo an intellectual detachment. 
There are other writers within the sublime tradition whose ideas illuminate Corner’s sense about 
the experience of  flight. As Barbara Freeman describes, Kant finds the sublime experience in 
the moment when, in the presence of  overwhelming (natural) might or vastness, the imagination 
collapses and “[r]eason finds in the moment of  chaos the opportunity to exercise its superior 
ability.”6 For Kant, the sublime is an exercise of  the mind as it recognizes its superiority over 
nature, in the face of  nature’s relative physical omnipotence. 
3  Wordsworth. Prelude
14  Barbara Claire Freeman, The Feminine Sublime: Gender and Excess in Women’s Fiction, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 995), .
5  Ibid., 
6  Ibid.,  
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Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a contemporary of  Wordsworth, takes a different tack. His poetic 
sense of  the sublime experience is one of  annihilation rather than victory. He writes, on en-
tering a Gothic cathedral: “. . . I am filled with devotion and awe . . . and the only sensible 
expression left is, “That I am nothing!”7 
“Paradoxically,” Corner notes, “the view from above induces both humility and a sense of  om-
nipotent power.”18 Steeped as we are in the culture of  enduring Romantic landscape traditions, 
perhaps it is not surprising that we report the range of  their sublime sentiments. Looking at the 
vast landscape from above and trying to understand our relationship to it, we, like Wordsworth 
or Coleridge, have trouble generating a measured response. Instead, we tend toward extreme 
conclusions of  arrogance or humility.
But what, in particular, does this response have to do with the aerial view? It is clear that, 
for the sublime machinations of  the mind that we have explored, flight in an airplane is not 
required. To understand our relationship to different aerial views, then, we can begin to make 
an important distinction: an aerial view from a plane or from a precipice is similar insofar as 
provides the same opportunities for a sublime response. 
Not all aerial views, however, are this simple. To better understand the precise agencies of  
different views, we need to keep an eye on their geometries of  seeing. In particular, it helps to 
pay attention to the place of  observing bodies. 
As Elizabeth Grosz reminds us, “we don’t just have bodies but are our bodies.”9 Indeed, it is 
the way that the body positions itself  in relation to its surroundings that underlies our notion 
of  “landscape.” As Corner explains elsewhere, the beginning of  the landscape tradition is 
understood as the popular emergence of  the subject out of  the scene. Whereas people once 
lived on the land in embedded, embodied, intimate relationships with their working environ-
ments, “landscape” as we understand it arose with the practice of  picturing or viewing the 
landscape—of  beholding it in a detached manner as a scenic, ideological, and instrumental 
object.20 
  Freeman, The Feminine Sublime, 9.
  Corner, Aerial Representation, 6.
19  Elizabeth Grosz. “Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Real.” in Architecture from the Outside. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press, 200.) 6.
23  James Corner.  “Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes.” in Recovering Landscape, ed. James Corner. (New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 999.) 54-55.
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It is this role of  a detached, viewing subject looking out over the landscape that Corner assumes 
while in flight. His experience plays out as a direct negotiation between seer and scene. The 
prosthesis of  the plane facilitates a kind of  extended, hovering leap into the air: the body is 
mechanically held aloft, and allowed to temporarily defy gravity, while its physical needs are 
provisionally met by the regulated environment of  the cabin. It is a remarkable technology by 
which the body can gain alitutude, but it is only this. While airplane flight is an extraordinary 
experience, the type of  seeing it permits—where one casts one’s eyes directly over the landscape 
from above—is not different in kind from an earthbound aerial perspective. In each case, the 
body engages the scene in a direct fashion.
On the other hand, the satellite view—the method behind the Greenness Map—allows us to 
approach the landscape in a categorically different way. At the simplest level, the satellite is use-
ful because it is able to maintain a position that, for physical or practical reasons, our embodied 
human eyes cannot. But it also changes the geometry of  our view. Inserted into the line of  sight 
between the viewer and the scene, the sensing body of  the satellite institutes a middle node 
through which the gaze must pass. We could say that our vector of  sight travels to the satellite, 
through its eye and back to the earth below; or we could say that we are watching the satellite 
watch the earth. In either case, the satellite sets our bodies at a distance behind its remote eye, 
and we see the world vicariously through its technology of  surrogate flight. Airplane flight can 
be breathtaking, but the geometry of  the satellite view engages (and disengages) the body in 
more complex ways.
The difference in the geometry of  the satellite view produces unique opportunities and effects; 
ones that are worth considering on their own, apart from general aerial histories. As airplane 
flight (and perhaps most importantly, its mass-accessibility)2 can be seen as a modification and 
enhancement of  the previous ways one could gain a bird’s-eye view, the remote-sensing satellite 
also emerges as the technological fulfillment of  a much older history.22
Remarkably, we can find the particular advantages of  the satellite view explored, exploited and 
debated many centuries before any spacecraft takes to the skies. In an ancient tale of  second-
hand flight, its technologies and operations begin to come into focus. 
2  Waldheim,  “Aerial Representation.”
22  Cosgrove makes a similar note that: “. . . for all its radical newness, actually witnessing the globe culminates a long 
genealogy of imagining and reflecting upon the possibility of doing so.”  Apollo’s Eye. ix. 
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Planetary Diagram after Macrobius, c. 9th century.
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as far as may be from the body
It is as a conclusion to his political treatise treatise On the Commonwealth (De Re Publica) that Cicero 
pens the tale known as Scipio’s Dream. At the time he is writing, Cicero is a high-profile political 
figure in his late-middle age, working amid both popular support and powerful enemies.23 
The time of  the tale is set about a century earlier, when the main interlocutor, “Publius” (also 
known as Scipio Aemilianus, or Scipio Africanus Minor), is a young Roman general poised to 
follow in the footsteps of  his celebrated grandfather. He will, like his grandfather, distinguish 
himself  as a hero of  a Punic war (the third Punic war in lieu of  the second), and later as a 
statesman
One night, as the young Scipio’s life is poised to unfold, he has a prophetic and omniscient 
vision. He dreams that he is transported up over the earth to a “lofty perch, dazzling and glori-
ous, set among the radiant stars.”24 There he meets his late father and grandfather, Paulus and 
Africanus, who set before him the triumphs and challenges that will befall him throughout his 
political life. His fate isn’t an easy assignment. To elucidate the sense of  it all, Scipio’s ancestors 
spend the remainder of  the Dream—the bulk of  it—narrating the scene that extends below and 
around them in their heavenly seat, laying out a mapping of  the earth and the cosmos, of  the 
relationships between mortality and eternity, and between body and soul. 
Although he is fascinated by the heavenly spheres of  the universe around him, Scipio is continu-
ally captivated by his view of  the earth at the centre of  it all. Africanus chides him for his fasci-
nation with the mortal realm, and a glance over its geography confirms the young Scipio’s folly. 
Africanus points to uninhabitable icy realms around the earth’s poles, and a torrid region at 
the equator. Sandwiched between these extremes are two moderate zones that are nonetheless 
dominated by uncultivated deserts, and only speckled with civilization. From their Apollonian 
perspective, Africanus brings into focus the tiny extents of  earthly kingdoms against the vastness 
of  the universe. Furthermore, the old hero underlines, the mortal realm is petty and perishable; 
23 Marcus Tullius Cicero. On The Commonwealth. trans. George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith (New York: 
Library of Liberal Arts.,96), 2-4 
24 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Political Works of Marcus Tullius Cicero: Comprising his Treatise on the Commonwealth; and his 
Treatise on the Laws, trans. Francis Barham, Esq. (London: Edmund Spettigue, 1841-42), accessed 28 August 2012, http://oll.
libertyfund.org/title/546/33.   
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and fame in it is inconsequential and fleeting. Human purpose, Africanus says, is to “guard” or 
“look after” the earth while the soul is imprisoned in the body, but also to anticipate the soul’s 
final home among the greater, perfect and eternal realm of  the stars. He adjures the young 
Scipio to pursue his life accordingly:
Train [the immortal soul] in the noblest ways! Now the noblest concerns of  the soul have to do with the 
security of  your country, and the soul which is employed and disciplined in such pursuits will fly more speedily 
to this abode [among the stars], its natural home. This journey it will make the swifter, if  it looks abroad, 
while still imprisoned in the flesh, and if, by meditating upon that which lies beyond it, it divorces itself  as 
far as may be from the body.” 25
This final advice from Africanus cleverly twists together the metaphysical imperative of  the 
Dream with both its subject and its approach: for while Cicero contemplates the universe, his 
body is nowhere in sight. Instead, he sends his gaze out like a line, hooking it over Scipio’s 
heavenly perch before directing it back towards the scene. In this way, Scipio becomes a satel-
lite: an elevated mooring-point for the flight of  Cicero’s mind, and a set of  seeing-eyes that he 
can calibrate to transmit the image he desires. In the meantime, with his mind free to roam 
the heavens and twirl the sphere of  the earth about in his imagination, Cicero’s body remains 
somewhere at a distance, entirely detached from his contemplations.  
Cicero’s contrivance to reinforce the message of  his treatise by following the metaphysical ad-
vice that it offers makes for a tidy piece of  philosophy. But there are other persuasive reasons for 
Cicero, in composing this political treatise, to remain out of  view. The first, to which he himself  
attests, is the personal protection that it offers. Eschewing a first-person discourse for third-
party dialogue, Cicero is able to voice his political ideas through some well-loved and long-dead 
heroes of  the republic. “The dignity of  the personages len[ds] weight to the discourse,” he tells 
his brother in a letter. 26 Furthermore, it’s a strategy that allows him to sidestep any discussions 
of  recent political affairs. This is, he says, “the very thing I wished from the first to avoid, lest 
in describing our times, I should offend our contemporaries. I desire altogether to escape this 
danger. . .”27 It’s a prudent consideration: at the time of  writing he has recently returned from 
political exile, and a decade later will be assassinated by a political enemy. 
The particular subject matter of  the Dream lends Cicero’s choice of  a satellite perspective 
further appeal. As Cicero explains in other writings, he sees a temperate, quiet, and restrained 
25  Cicero, On The Commonwealth. trans. Sabine and Smith, 26.
26  Cicero, The Political Works, trans. Francis Barham.
2  Ibid. 
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mind—one that does not become inflamed with perturbations or violent motions—as necessary 
to the exercise of  wisdom and right reason.28 And while the other (surviving) content of  On The 
Commonwealth can be written as a suitably placid, measured dialogue, easily operating within 
the domain of  reason, writing on the fantastical subject of  the Dream presents challenges. The 
Dream’s speaker is obligated to experience a supernatural, otherworldly encounter (for how 
else could one become privy to such cosmic knowledge?), and such a coup de foudre seems to 
demand visceral reactions if  it is to be plausible to the reader. In this sense, Scipio acts not just 
as a second set of  eyes, ears and lips for Cicero; but as a completely surrogate sensing body, 
expressing tears, speechlessness, despair, and astonishment in the author’s place, and sparing 
him the problem of  becoming personally involved in any of  these intemperate reactions. 
From another point of  view, Cicero’s choice of  an indirect approach to the sticky subject mat-
ter of  the Dream is not just convenient, but critical. For as we learn from its text, the heavenly 
viewpoint that Cicero desires (and that Scipio inhabits) is usually reserved for immortal souls. To 
write the view as a first-hand account, then, would transgress the very divine orders that Cicero 
describes. In this way, the satellite view provides a vital position from which Cicero can offer up 
his physical and metaphysical mapping without undermining its legitimacy. 
Here in Scipio’s Dream, without the aid of  any complex instruments, we can see satellite tech-
nology already beginning to exercise some remarkable effects.  
28   Marcus Tullius Cicero. “Book IV: On other perturbations of the mind” in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations.,trans. C.D. Yonge, (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), accessed 29 August 2012, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14988/14988-h/14988-h.htm.  
48
What, I ask, then, is the principal thing in human life? Not to have filled the seas with fleets, nor to have 
planted the standard of the nation on the shores of the Red Sea, nor, when land has been exhausted, to have 
wandered for the injury of others over the Ocean in quest of the unknown. Rather it is to have grasped in mind 
the whole universe . . . 29
 - Seneca
29  Lucius Annaeus Seneca, John Clarke, Sir Archibald Geikie. Physical Science in the Time of Nero, Being a Translation 
of the Quaestiones Naturales of Seneca (London: Macmillan and Co., 90), accessed 0 January 202, http://archive.
org/details/physicalsciencei00seneiala,.
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5
The remote eye of  the satellite is a lens that can focus or distort an image; that can read and 
retransmit what it sees while floating free of  the body. It is a tool that can be directed to slice 
a certain type of  information from the scene and to construct a particular set of  data. With 
its mediating eye continuously tethered between the cartographer and the earth, it is both an 
instrument and an infrastructure for mapping.
In our examination of  satellite imaging so far—in Scipio’s Dream, the Greenness Map, and 
Corner’s writing—a number of  themes carry through. All seek a calculated divorce from direct 
experiences of  the body and its sensations in order to ensure legitimate or factual representa-
tions of  the world. Further, they all hint at ways in which the synoptic aerial view promotes the 
agenda of  an heroic national project. 
But while the scrim of  the satellite is an ubiquitous and familiar feature of  modern aerial imag-
ing, widely accepted in the era of  Corner and the Greenness Map, it seems that some of  Cicero’s 
early critics disapprove of  the structural distance it produces. We learn this from Macrobius, a 
sixth-century philosopher who writes a lengthy Commentary on the Dream of  Scipio. 
The problem of  the Dream’s satellite structure is an important concern for Macrobius. We can 
guess this because it becomes the first subject of  discussion in his Commentary, preceding any 
debate about the Dream’s metaphysical ideas. Macrobius recounts the attack of  a critic who 
denounces the style with which Cicero treats his material: “If  you wished to impart to us a 
conception of  the heavenly realms and reveal the conditions of  souls,” he asks, “why did you not 
do so in a simple and straightforward manner, instead of  defiling the very portals of  truth with 
imaginary character, event, and setting, in a vile imitation of  a playwright?”30 
In Cicero’s defense, Macrobius argues that the use of  a story to explain the condition of  souls 
should be considered a completely acceptable method for a philosopher, since its narratio fabuloso 
is not a type of  fiction that is pure invention; but rather, “rests on a solid foundation of  truth, 
30 Macrobius, Ambrosius Aurelius Theodosius, William Harris Stahl, and Marcus Tullius Cicero. Commentary on the Dream 
of Scipio. (New York: Columbia University Press, 952), 4.  The criticism here is actually levelled at Plato’s Er, which takes a 
similar fable-like approach to its philosophical subject; Macrobius sees that it applies equally to Cicero’s Dream.
veils
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The imaginative power of geography “offers divine intellect to human ingenuity, as if it were by nature celestial, 
demonstrating how with true discipline, we can leap up within ourselves, without the aid of wings, so that we 
may view the earth through an image marked on a parchment. 1
 - Francesco Berlinghieri, Italian scholar on Ptolemy, 1482. 
3  Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye, 09.
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which is treated in a fictitious style.”32 But as he expands his argument, it becomes clear that he 
does not regard the fictive dimension of  the story as an inert layer of  translation for the meta-
physics of  the Dream, or as an intermediate screen with absolute transparency through which 
truths are projected. Instead, the presence of  a scrim of  fiction has enough substance to take on 
a moral imperative. Macrobius calls the Dream “.. a decent and dignified conception of  holy 
truths ... presented beneath a modest veil of  allegory.”33 And finally, at the climax of  his rebuke, 
Macrobius asserts that this veil of  allegory in the Dream is the only natural and appropriate 
format for the kind of  metaphysics it discusses:
“. . . philosophers make use of  fabulous narratives; not without a purpose, however, nor merely to entertain, 
but because they realize that a frank, open exposition of  herself  is distasteful to Nature, who, just as she has 
withheld an understanding of  herself  from the uncouth senses of  men by enveloping herself  in variegated 
garments, has also desired to have her secrets handled by more prudent individuals through fabulous narratives. 
Accordingly, her sacred rites are veiled in mysterious representations so that she may not have to show herself  
even to initiates. Only eminent men of  superior intelligence gain a revelation of  her truths; the others must 
satisfy their desire for worship with a ritual drama which prevents her secrets from becoming common.”34
 
To Macrobius, then, the veil of  representation or fiction in the Dream is a crucial philosophi-
cal tool. It preserves the natural distance between Nature’s secrets (sacred) and man’s sensory 
explorations (uncouth), but also puts in place a narrative through and in which a kind of  proxy 
exploration can take place. To read the narrative is to participate in its ritual drama. The drama 
unfolds as follows: motivated by a desire for knowledge, the reader explores the black-and-white 
text of  the Dream, and peering through its mediating image, can begin to make out the living 
forms of  the universe (and of  Cicero) that hover behind it. It is a ritual because, through the 
fixed object of  the text, a conventionalized exploration of  the universe can be repeated again 
and again in a similar format, by many different readers. And as the critic and Macrobius both 
hint, inscribed in its dramatic arc is a set of  sensations: a curiosity that becomes, in parts, whet-
ted, amazed, fulfilled and frustrated by the Dream’s revelations, as the text predetermines and 
limits how and how closely the thing can be grasped. To Macrobius this is just as it should be; 
to Cicero’s critic it’s just willful irritation.
What of  the critic’s accusation that this arrangement is unfair, indeed “vile?” Macrobius would 
call it sour grapes: he insinuates, without much subtlety, that this critic is simply not among the 
“eminent men of  superior intelligence” who deserve to be privileged with a clearer view. 
32  Ibid., 5
33  Ibid., 5. 
34  Ibid., 6-.
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‘And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the 
mile!’ 
‘Have you used it much?’ I enquired.
 ‘It has never been spread out, yet,’ said Mein Herr : ‘the farmers objected : they said it would cover the whole 
country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does 
nearly as well.’5
 - Lewis Carroll
… In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied 
the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable 
Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the 
Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some 
Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, 
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is 
no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.
  Suarez Miranda,Viajes de varones prudentes, Libro IV,Cap. XLV, Lerida, 1658”36
 - Jorge Luis Borges
35  Lewis Carroll. “The Man in the Moon” in Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. (London: Macmillan and Co., 93), accessed 22 
July 09, http://archive.org/details/sylviebrunoconcl00carriala, 69.
36  Jorge Luis Borges. “On Exactitude in Science” in Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley. 325.
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We, on the other hand, might just see the critic’s protestations as unrealistic. As satellite 
technologies have become ubiquitous, we have become used to the ways that they mediate 
our view. It seems unreasonable to expect that Cicero should have been able to provide a 
transparent description of  the heavenly realms and the conditions of  souls; as it would be 
unreasonable for us to expect today that a satellite map should be able to capture and make 
available an uncompromised portrait of  the spatial and temporal dimensions of  greenness as it 
extends over a whole continent. The Greenness Map, like the Dream, relies on a particular set 
of  abstractions in order to approach its otherwise unapproachably complex subject. If  Cicero’s 
narrative establishes a ritual drama for understanding the universe, the Map could be said to 
stage a similar kind of  re-enactment of  greenness: this time re-presented on the proscenium 
of  the computer screen. And where the Dream uses devices of  fiction to render the scene, the 
Map relies on its own set of  generalizations and tolerances to flatten, scale, simplify, frame, and 
colour its subject. These tools, as we have seen, can choose what is revealed, produce opacities, 
and even allow for deliberate obfuscations. As map-readers, we are left trying to make out the 
details of  greenness through their screen.
When we step back to consider them, these satellite processes—and the maps that they place in 
our hands—leave something to be desired. But despite their limitations, we would not reason 
that these maps should not be made. Rather, we rely on their distilling and simplifying effects for 
the practical and serviceable information that they produce. We find them invaluable because 
they give us remarkable capacities to represent the world; in particular, to selectively represent 
information out of  the world in a way that’s useful to us. The notion of  a “perfect” map is a 
farce: several writers—including Lewis Carroll and Borges—have written amusing fables about 
the absurdity of  creating a 1:1 scale map that exactly reflects its territory. But on the other 
hand, a perfectly complete understanding of  territories seems to be what we are after. Mapping 
technologies are continually advancing as we invent tools that can take more precise measure-
ments. We are constantly developing representational techniques that reduce distortion and 
make maps clearer, more easily accessible, more detailed and more expansive. Corner identifies 
this ongoing evolution in aerial representation as a necessary facet in the continued enrichment 
of  cultural life.37 And so while maps and their subjects remain at an inevitable distance from 
each other, they seem to be drawn together in a kind of  asymptotic relationship of  infinite ap-
proach-without-touching. “All men reach out to know,”38 Aristotle states axiomatically; and the 
satellite extends and elaborates that reach. 
3  Corner.,“Aerial Representation,” 9.
38  Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press, 1998.),109.
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The Greenness Maps are just one project of  the EROS facility. Hunkered squarely in the centre 
of  the continent in rural South Dakota, it houses massive digital and physical databases of  U.S. 
government aerial and satellite information. Here vast amounts of  data—what they refer to as 
“the raw material of  science”—is stored, organized, interpreted and distributed. This work is 
called, suitably enough, Earth Resources Observation and Science; but the resulting acronym, 
EROS, comes as a surprise. For an organization committed to providing impartial scientific 
information, it feels incongruous to see a name for desire brought into view. 
eros
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The EROS multidisciplinary staff  uses their unique expertise in remote sensing-based science and technolo-
gies to . . . address the Nation’s most critical needs.
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Bingham Canyon Open Pit Copper Mine:  A Greenness Map overlaid with an aerial photograph. According to mining-
technology.com, Bingham Mine is “the largest man-made excavation on earth.” 
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“The Greek word eros denotes ‘want,’ ‘lack,’  ‘desire for that which is missing.’ ”39 says poet and 
classicist Anne Carson. Carson spends her book Eros the Bittersweet hunting out eros’ meaning and 
tracking its enigmatic qualities: she searches out the mysterious circumstances of  its emergence, 
the sensations that tell us that it is there, the ways it seems to act, and what it seems to be. 
Although it is often associated with romantic love, Carson finds that eros is not limited to that 
sort of  desire. In one instance, Sappho likens the object of  eros to a sweet apple that remains 
on a high branch after harvest: something that is tantalizing but out of  reach. For Sokrates, the 
pursuit of  knowledge is erotic: he talks about having a knowledge “only of  erotic things.”40 The 
way to know Eros, he offers in Plato’s Phaedrus, is by its wings: 
“Now the mortals call him winged Eros
but immortals call him Pteros, because of  the wing-growing necessity.”41
Sokrates’ pun on Eros—Pteros—incorporates the Greek word for wings. It’s a playful but potent 
identification of  eros’ unmistakable sensation: it engenders a sense of  flight, or a need for flight, 
where previously there was none. 
In another poetic fragment about falling in love, Sappho also makes note of  eros’ wings. “It puts 
the heart in my chest on wings,”42 she says; here identifying the impetus to flight as a sensation 
that emerges inside the lover. The image of  wings beating inside a chest is both thrilling and 
frightening, for their effect is equivocal: promising both liberation and violence. 
Carson examines Sappho’s poem to understand the conditions that cause the wings to sprout. “It 
is a poem,” she explains, “about the lover’s mind in the act of  constructing desire for itself.”43 
39  Anne Carson. Eros the Bittersweet. (Champaign: Dalkey Archive Press., 99), 0-.
40  Ibid., 0.
4  Ibid.,6-63. Carson notes that the translation of this passage is complicated, as it does not make clear “whose are 
the wings and whose is the necessity.”
42  Ibid., 3.
43  Ibid., 6. Carson also argues here that, opposing some other interpretations, the poem is not about jealousy or praise 
or “the normal world of erotic responses.” 
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He seems to me equal to gods that man
who opposite you
sits and listens close
to your sweet speaking 
and lovely laughing—oh it
puts the heart in my chest on wings
for when I look at you, a moment, then no speaking
is left in me 
no: tongue breaks, and thin
fire is racing under my skin
and in eyes no sight and drumming
fills ears
and cold sweat holds me and shaking
grips me all, greener than grass 
I am and dead--or almost 
I seem to me.44 
 Sappho, fragment 1.
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The scene of  the poem is composed simply of  three figures: he, me, and you. “He seems to me 
equal to gods that man,” Sappho begins, measuring up the figure of  the unnamed man against 
herself. We don’t learn who he is. What makes him seem divine to her is his position in space, 
where he is able to sit and listen close to one with sweet speaking and a lovely laugh. This one, 
we learn, is Sappho’s beloved. 
Watching the exchange between the man and the beloved, or watching her through his eyes, 
Sappho feels the emergence of  eros’ wings. “. . . [W]here eros is lack,” Carson explains, “its 
activation calls for three structural components—lover, beloved, and that which comes between 
them.”45 In other words, the man completes the figure of  eros, making palpable to Sappho that 
which she is missing. Carson again: 
“They are three points of  transformation on a circuit of  possible relationship, electrified by desire so that they 
touch not touching. . . . When the circuit-points connect, perception leaps, and something becomes visible, on 
the triangular path where volts are moving, that would not be visible without the three-part structure. The 
difference between what is and what could be is visible. The ideal is projected on a screen of  the actual, in 
a kind of  stereoscopy.”46
What becomes visible to Sappho during the erotic poem is the possibility of  sitting next to her 
beloved, of  inhabiting the man’s place. “For when I look at you”, she says; and then her gaze 
hinges, pulled back inside her own body as she is propelled into the space of  desire. 
Here we learn what kind of  damage eros’ wings can do to a lover. Senses lose their bearings. 
Faculties are paralysed, annihilated, overcome. Hot and cold shake her at once; every fibre of  
her being seems wracked within a hair’s breadth of  collapse when she takes a last, equivocating 
look over herself. 
Perhaps to her surprise, she does not collapse. Instead, in this precarious centre of  eros, the 
fleeting instant when she finds herself  dead—or almost dead, or at least almost seeming dead 
to herself—she also finds herself  surpassingly green.
54  Carson, Eros, 2-3.
55  Ibid., 6.
46  Ibid., 6-.
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. . . 
and cold sweat holds me and shaking
grips me all, greener than grass
I am and dead--or almost
 I seem to me
But all is to be dared, because even a person of poverty
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This poem of  Sappho’s, a fragment of  a longer poem, does not properly end in the instant of  
her feeling-green. In fact, in another translation of  Sappho’s work, Carson reveals that history 
has conserved one final, partial idea from the poem. It is hard to say where the thought is lead-
ing, but its opening imperative reveals the poet’s view of  what has just happened.
 “But all is to be dared, because even a person of  poverty . . .”47 
it declares, and then trails off. If  “all is to be dared,” Sappho seems to regret nothing of  the 
burning and trembling that eros has caused her, the seeming-risk to her mortality that she has 
just endured. Instead, she underlines that the imperative of  falling in love is to dare everything, 
to dare completely. 
To what end? Fairy-tale endings tell us that what is hoped for when we fall in love is a happily ever 
after: an embrace of  the beloved that seems to extend right out of  this world and out of  time. But 
Carson argues that for Sappho, eros is not a means to an end but an end itself, or rather, a begin-
ning. “On the surface of  it,” she says, “the lover wants the beloved.” However, in this poem: 
“Union would be annihilating. What the lover in this poem needs is to be able to face the beloved and not be 
destroyed; that is, she needs to attain the condition of  ‘the man who sits and listens closely.’ His ideal impas-
sivity constitutes for her a glimpse of  a new possible self. . . . That godlike self, never known before now comes 
into focus and vanishes again in one quick view.”48 
Carson calls this view a kind of  stereoscopy, a “touch not touching.” It is clear, in Sappho’s 
poem, what is not touching: the poem is built on the distance between lover and beloved. But 
something is also touching, for something real is happening: Sappho watches it and tells us 
about its real destabilizing effects. From the outside, she does not seem to move a muscle; but 
there is nonetheless a sense of  reaching, of  sensory contact, of  something in her body being 
drawn out.49  What touches Sappho is the birth of  the notion of  what could be, a fresh sensation 
4  Anne Carson, trans. If Not, Winter: Fragments of Sappho. (New York: Vintage Books, 2002,) 63.
4  Carson, Eros, 62.
49  Ibid., 36
what is touching
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running through the moment, a rush of  wind stirred up by eros’ beating wings that momentarily 
disturbs her equilibrium.
The thing that touches the lover in love is ineffable, difficult to put a finger on. But reading theo-
rist Brian Massumi, it seems that it is our mode of  perception that implicitly opens us up to its 
mysterious sensation. For Massumi describes something similar at work in the way we perceive 
things in general; and in particular, when we look at art: 
We never just register what’s actually in front of  our eyes. With every sight we see imperceptible qualities, 
we abstractly see potential, we implicitly see a life dynamic, we virtually live relation. . . . It’s an event. . . . 
full of  all sorts of  virtual movement. It’s real movement, because something has happened: the body has been 
capacitated. It’s been relationally activated. It is alive in the world, poised for what may come. 50
Usually, he says, we are not aware of  seeing this potential, of  perceiving this life dynamic (which 
he also calls vitality-affect, or thinking-feeling.) In everyday life, the life-dynamic is background-
ed by our orientation to action in the world. Art, however, is effective and affective because it 
engages our bodies to action but suspends the potential to action. This suspension foregrounds 
our perception of  the life dynamic, even when we look at something as simple as a motif: 
That’s why we see movement in a motif. The form “naturally” poises the body for a certain set of  potentials. 
The design calls forth a certain vitality affect – the sense we would have, for example, of  moving our eyes 
down a branch of  rustling leaves, and following that movement with our hands. But that life dynamic comes 
without the potential for it to be actually lived. It’s the same lived relation as when we “actually” see leaves, 
it’s the same potential. But it’s purely potential. 51
Here, Massumi’s description of  the life-dynamic appears to produce effects similar to those that 
we have watched arise in the flash of  Sappho’s eros. For eros’ triangulation arrests Sappho in 
her dawning awareness of  potential: while she sits powerless, we see her body seared-through by 
the impetus to act. Sappho can’t actually approach her beloved (as it would annihilate her), she 
can’t switch places with the man, she can’t master her emotions like a god; but all at once she 
feels all of  these potentials emerge. In their emergence, Sappho feels something stir up: she sees 
herself  seeing her own drive to action, to change, to become-other. The sensation is both painful 
50  Brian Massumi, “The Thinking-Feeling of What Happens,” Inflexions . “How is Research-Creation?”, May 200, www.
inflexions.org, 5
5  Ibid., 5.
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and beautiful: feeling “the current of  eros pass through,” she is captivated by its transformative, 
revealing, and enlivening effects. 
“We don’t just look, we sense ourselves alive,”52  Massumi says; and his words capture perfectly 
the vitality of  Sappho’s gaze. Indeed, it is these same effects that pique Carson’s fascination 
with eros. “I would like to grasp why it is,” she says, “that these two activities, falling in love and 
coming to know, make me feel genuinely alive.”53 
52  Massumi, Thinking Feeling, 5. 
53  Carson, Eros, 0.
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As Carson notes, she finds eros at work beyond the realm of  falling in love; in particular, she 
identifies its sensation when she is reaching out to understand something, or coming to know. 
Looking to the way that Sokrates describes loving and learning in Plato’s Phaedrus, she finds that 
the erotic currents that drive a lover’s pursuit of  her beloved follow a similar spatial and tempo-
ral structure as the flows that carry an inquiring mind in its search for knowledge. Reaching to 
understand the world around him, the curious thinker constructs his desire for knowledge in the 
gap between the known and the unknown, and the awareness of  that which holds them apart. 
The inability to resolve this difference is felt as a gap or lack where eros resonates. It is felt in 
the imagined future that tears itself  out of  the “now” and floats like a spectre over the present 
moment. Like desire for a beloved, it singes through the body of  the learner with feelings both 
sweet and bitter. The pursuit is bliss, but it also torments because the thing that is desired cannot 
be grasped. 
Until it is. 
What happens when one comes to know—when the erotic pursuit of  knowledge comes to a 
close—is a subject taken up in a whimsical way by Mark Twain, in a small book called called 
Eve’s Diary. Satirical, at times troublesome, but often poignant, Eve’s Diary is an imaginative 
recounting of  the first days in Eden, narrated by Eve. In the Garden, Twain portrays Eve as 
the first scientist, one who is interested in reaching out to understand the world around her 
by watching and experimenting in it. In the process of  her self-education, Eve makes some 
discoveries about what learning is like; and particularly, what happens when she comes to grasp 
a piece of  knowledge tightly in hand. 
She is troubled for some time about how a waterfall in the Garden can run continuously without 
exhausting itself. One day she reports that she has learned (by experiment) that in order for 
water to be able to flow down into the pool each day, the water must run uphill at night while 
she can’t see it. While she is proud of  her discovery, she also mourns it: 
 
trying to find out and finding out vs. 
trying to find out and not finding out
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Even trying to find out and not finding out is just as interesting as trying to find out and finding out, and I 
don’t know but more so. The secret of  the water was a treasure until I GOT it; then the excitement all went 
away, and I recognized a sense of  loss.54
There are, of  course, more mysteries in the Garden for Eve to work out. She hasn’t yet discov-
ered how to prove that rocks float (“like wood, and dry leaves, and feathers, and plenty of  other 
things”); and though she keeps searching for a way to prove her conjecture, she fairly dreads 
finding it:
I shall find a way—then THAT excitement will go. Such things make me sad; because by and by when I 
have found out everything there won’t be any more excitements, and I do love excitements so! The other night 
I couldn’t sleep for thinking about it.55
Twain’s Eve is captivated by the pursuit of  knowledge, the excitement of  hurtling towards 
knowing. But once she gets the thing she is after, and the space of  her desire collapses, she finds 
that the sense of  wonder that once moved in it sorely missed. Her body quickly becomes restless 
again “to feel the current of  eros pass through.”56
54  Mark Twain, Eve’s Diary (Project Gutenberg), released 4 June 04, www.gutenberg.net.
55  Ibid.
56  Carson, Eros, 62.
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For all of  its light-heartedness, there is something serious and immensely familiar about Twain’s 
image of  Eve in Eden--the way that she tosses and turns one night because she cannot figure 
something out, and the next night because she thinks she has. For especially during Twain’s 
lifetime, America finds itself  grappling with just this insecurity: on one hand driven to unfold 
and settle the landscape, on the other hand unsettled at the prospect of  one day finding nothing 
new to discover. Indeed, the tension in these paradoxical impulses still agitates: our investment 
in the sensations of  discovery runs deep. We can understand Eve’s sense that some serious thing 
will assuredly be lost when she gets to the bottom of  the garden. 
In his seminal 1989 book The End of  Nature, environmentalist Bill McKibben tries to describe 
the need of  the American imagination for unknown realms, in order to feel itself  not hemmed 
in by civilization. His arguments tend toward the mystical and romantic, but he is nonetheless 
on to something. “The wonder of  nature does not depend on its freshness,” he asserts somewhat 
unconvincingly. “But we still feel the need for pristine places, places substantially unaltered by 
man. Even if  we do not visit them, they matter to us. We need to know that though we are 
surrounded by buildings there are vast places where the world goes on as it always has.”57  He 
makes the grudging concession that “[i]f  we can’t have places where no man has ever been, 
we can at least have spots where no man is at the moment.”58 In other words, we need spaces 
that we can understand as unequivocally outside of  human civilization, and ideally outside of  
the reach of  human impact. Without these spaces, McKibben asserts, something feels terribly 
wrong: they bear some critical psychic importance.
Indeed, the habit of  seeing the world as having an inside and an outside is a very old Western 
construction. The ancient Greek cosmographer Anaximander may have been the first to define 
the world in this manner: in his lost treatise from the sixth century B.C.E., he divides the stuff  
of  existence into the circumscribed, bounded body of  the known world, and an openly-extend-
ing, perhaps infinite external realm. In his book The Edges of  the Earth in Ancient Thought, James 
Romm suggests that Anaximander’s sense of  the world-proper, the oikumene, can be defined most 
closely as “a region made coherent by the intercommunication of  its inhabitants.” Outside of  
57  Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (New York: Random House, 99), 55.
5  Ibid., 55.
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the oikumene, the world is apeiron or boundless: an undifferentiated welter of  elements spilling 
outward without a border; an “uninhabited waste” full of  chaotic stuff  and perhaps monstrous 
or noble races. Outside the oikumene dwells an immeasureable (or at least unmeasured) expanse 
for which there is a lack of  information. It is not a void; but it will not surprise us that the space 
outside the oikumene is also called by Herodotus eremos, or empty space.59 
In broadest terms, Western mapping practice begins with the Ancient Greeks’ puddle of  oi-
kumene around the Mediterranean and, through time, extends outward. In his book Apollo’s Eye, 
Denis Cosgrove diligently tracks the changing modes and increasing extents of  world mapping 
practices. He notes that the expansion of  the known world proceeded with greatest earnestness 
from the 1500’s until around the beginning of  the 20th century: in 1904, with the farthest edges 
of  the earth coming into view, British academic Halford Mackinder declares the that world 
is witnessing the “final acts of  a four-century Columbian epoch.” Aided by growing global 
communication and cross-continental transportation networks, Western exploration at this time 
finds itself  in the throes of  completing its competitive project to “discover” and incorporate 
the totality of  global space within the framework of  modern capitalism. The penetration of  
continental interiors and the latitudinal encircling of  the earth “bringing East and West to-
gether within a single imaginative realm,” along with polar explorations, represents the final 
conquests of  global frontiers. As the end of  a long and defining project, the erasure of  these 
last “unknown” frontiers stirs up the discomforting prospect of  an earth with no “new” lands to 
discover, an earth that can be grasped in its totality.60 
Such a spatially enclosed globe leaves little room for new heroic voyages or the expansion of  em-
pires; no space for new conquests by the march of  history. Ironically, the Western imagination’s 
perception that it now exercises a totalizing reach over the globe seems to present a threat to 
its own identity: following the death of  the American frontier, declared in the 1890 census, 
Frederick Jackson Turner “reflect[s] anxiously on the necessity of  open space for the continued 
survival of  American ‘civilization.’”6 
One of  America’s responses to its newly-closed, now stifling continent is the pursuit of  new 
frontiers. Before the end of  the century, America begins its own colonisations: as though still 
propelled by the inertia of  its westward push, it spills out over the terminal edge of  the conti-
nent to take the Hawaiian Islands. As well, the frontier of  outer space gains new importance. 
59  Romm, Edges of the Earth, 36.
60  Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye, 222.   
6  Ibid., 22. 
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Cosgrove reports that the Buffalo Pan-American Exposition of  1901 satirically “offered trips to 
the Moon, the terrestrial globe supposedly having jaded the geographical imagination:” 
“The prodigal modern Midway is fairly using up the earth, A few more Expositions and we shall have 
nothing left that is wonderfully wonderful, nothing superlatively strange; and the delicious word “foreign” 
will have dropped out of  the language. Where shall we go to get a new sensation? ... Behold the world is a 
sucked orange.’”62
The loss of  frontier “wilderness” in America also prompts the institution of  its first national 
parks. But these “preserved wildernesses,” curated and controlled, contained within the realm 
of  civilized space, perhaps only mythically accommodate that old “unknown”. They satisfy 
some impulse to step away from the built world but, for a frontier mentality, they also leave 
something to be desired. “[Y]ou can’t be the first to explore blank spots on the map or to 
climb the mountains anymore,” a modern-day adventurer tells McKibben, in between trips to 
encircle Mt. Everest and to row from Tierra del Fugo to Antarctica. “It has a lot to do with style 
now,”63 he concludes; and we sense that this is truly a second-rate option. However, even this 
compromised scope for terrestrial exploration seems to be drying up: in March 2013, a team set 
out to achieve the historical “first” of  crossing Antarctica during the polar winter, describing it 
as the last great polar challenge.64
What is striking about both McKibben’s adventurer and the Antarctic team is that they are after 
nothing in particular: only the reach for new places, territories or territories of  experience on 
which they alone can place their names. As Carson shows us, it is only on the surface that one 
who desires wants the object of  her desire. It is the object that we can watch her pursue, but 
what she is really after is the desire itself. 
If  the Columbian epoch of  terrestrial exploration is really on its way out, it is not going quickly 
or without a fight; for as McKibben points out, we feel that something critical is at stake in the 
loss of  these “empty” spaces. Cartographer Alexandre von Humboldt, in his 1844 Cosmos: A 
Sketch of  the Physical Description of  the Universe, puts as fine point on the problem as I have found. 
He writes about our psychical dependence on “unknown and unopened” territories:
62  Cosgrove, Apollo, 229-230.
63  McKibben, End, 46.
64 “Explorer Sir Ranulph Fiennes on historic attempt at crossing Antarctica”, on The Sunday Edition, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corportation, 24 March 13, http://www.cbc.ca/thesundayedition/shows/2013/03/24/ranulph-fiennes/.
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. . . besides the pleasure derived from acquired knowledge there lurks in the mind of  man, and tinged with 
a shade of  sadness, an unsatisfied longing for something beyond the present--a striving towards regions yet 
unknown and unopened. Such a sense of  longing . . . animates the mysterious relation existing between that 
which the mind receives from without, and that which it reflects from its own depths to the external world.65 
An intriguing constellation emerges in this passage. Humboldt says that the longing that we 
feel when faced with “regions yet unknown” animates—makes or keeps alive—some perceived 
relation between ourselves (our depths!) and the world. But this relation is not just a question of  
space: our longing for “unknown and unopened” space is somehow conflated with our striving 
for “something beyond the present.” We perceive that our pursuit of  “new space” is tied to our 
access to new time. 
For Humboldt then, a future, and perhaps any future, is dependent on the existence of  unopened 
space and its hopeful, slightly melancholic pull. Michel Serres calls the wildish, vegetative spaces 
in the West, these peripheral or marginal green spaces, “the locus of  our sense of  history and 
time.”66 Humboldt would agree. 
65  Cosgrove, Apollo, 23.
66  Serres, “China Loam.” 9.
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The reach for the beloved, like the reach for new territories, is paradoxical. While it drives 
toward that which it wants, it must also somehow maintain the sense of  lack that motivated its 
reach in the first place. It is no surprise that this double-headed desire can cause trouble. 
As we have seen in the march of  global exploration, one way to keep desire alive is to continue 
to reach toward new spaces--to follow one conquest with another. It is clear that this strategy, 
a kind of  Casanova approach, cannot hold up forever in the Earth’s finite space. Indeed, we 
would say that a lover who seeks to consume all that he desires is troublesome, for such a lover 
is prone not to notice what he also lays to waste. Likewise, with an eye always fixed on some 
future territory, the explorer’s mentality considers no future in the here and now. And if  he is 
eventually driven to completely replace “coming to know” the earth with “coming to know” the 
outer, possibly infinite region of  space, who knows what may happen to the ground on which 
he stands? 
Following Carson, we have constructed eros around a lover and a beloved, and that which keeps 
them apart. On one hand, identifying the actors of  eros in this way simply speaks to its subjec-
tivity, to the simple fact that the lover says to the object of  her affection “I love you.” On the 
other hand, it can suggest a hierarchy, where the lover is the active party (the one who is loving) 
and the beloved is construed as passive (the one who is being loved). It is the same construction 
that allows us to say, when we have learned something, that we have grasped it, or “got” it. 
Perhaps it is no surprise then that the lover’s pursuits can also tend toward grasping,. They can 
become acts of  abduction.
Carson explains that in some facets of  ancient Greek society, contemporary rituals indeed ac-
knowledge the lover as an abductor, casting the beloved as the coy or ashamed counterpart in a 
love affair. It is not clear to what degree these love affairs are consensual, but she suggests that 
they are permitted on the grounds of  a hierarchy defining who may act as the lover and and 
who the passive beloved. She relates the Cretan practice of  “ritual homosexual rape of  boys by 
their lovers,” in which “[t]he rape began with a conventional gift-exchange and ended with the 
rapist carrying off  his beloved on horseback for a two-month sojourn in hiding.”67 If  the man 
 6  Carson, Eros, 24.
abduction, strong-arming, and other wounds: 
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is of  equal or higher status, a fourth-century source reports, friends and family offer only mock 
resistence.68 “Legitimate marriage rites throughout the Greek world adopted much of  the same 
imagery and attitude,” Carson affirms. Vase-paintings often depict the wedding ceremony as 
the symbolic abduction of  the bride by the bridegroom, where “[t]he abducting bridegroom 
may hold his bride diagonally across his body as he mounts the wedding chariot; the bride ex-
presses unwillingness, . . . frequently she is seen pulling her veil across her face with one hand in 
the symbolic gesture of  female aidos (shame).” Carson underlines that the images should be not 
“interpreted as mythical scenes but as ideal representations of  normal wedding rites, bristling 
with ambiguities as such rituals do in many cultures.”69 Foreign as they are, these ritual abduc-
tions are striking illustrations of  the impulse to capture that can be implied in a lover’s reach.
The dynamic of  the erotic reach as a bid to seize hold, or to exert a controlling grasp, is often 
just beneath the surface of  the way that we have historically spoken about coming to know the 
landscape. Metaphors of  gender, sex and sexual pursuit are long-standing tropes used to analo-
gize our affair with the earth. We tend to imply hierarchy by employing gender terms, usually 
invoking what these terms have traditionally represented: the land (or earth or nature) has long 
been construed as female and passive territory on which an active, male, cultural subject acts. 
As such the land—and the living things and processes that constitute it—are rendered as a blank 
slate, a void or open space without an identity of  its own that is waiting to be taken up, given 
form and temporal structure. Using this metaphor, we read the land as a receptacle in which the 
contents of  history are to be inscribed.
In her book Reinventing Eden, Carolyn Merchant explores the ways that the project to build a 
new Eden in the “new world” of  the Americas renders it an ideal terrain for domination by 
an heroic settler-subject. Read through the lens of  Eden, America’s “virginal” lands, innocent 
and abundantly promising as they are, are nonetheless damned by the “fall from grace” that 
cast Adam and Eve out of  the Garden. As such, they are in need of  redemption, of  perfecting. 
Merchant quotes Thomas Morton, an English clergyman and early settler in Maine, whose 
1632 writings make vivid this vision for the settler in the landscape. “New England is like a “faire 
virgin longing to be sped and meete her lover in a Nuptiall bed,” Morton writes. “Her fruitful 
wombe . . . not being enjoyed is like a glorious tomb.”70 This quaint couplet has all the feel of  
a lusty bridegroom riding in on his horse to claim his virgin bride: no matter that he attributes 
the unholy longings to the bride.
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Using less explicitly sexual terms, Emerson writes a similar vision in 1844: 
“This great savage country should be furrowed by the plough, and combed by the harrow; these rough 
Alleganies should know their master; these foaming torrents should be bestridden by proud arches of  stone; 
these wild prairies should be loaded with wheat; the swamps with rice; the hill-tops should pasture innumer-
able sheep and cattle . . . “71
Morton and Emerson’s writings are antiquated, but their attitudes still linger. Reverend John 
Todd, best known as an abolitionist, writes in 1870 that: “Nature finds materials and it is for man 
to take and improve them.”72 Today, the USGS speaks instead of  “resource development.”73 
The take-over is described in different terms, but the approach of  this contemporary body to 
the landscape is not so great a departure from those of  the past.
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Throughout her book Eros the Bittersweet, Carson looks to many sources—to poets ancient and 
modern, to linguistics, philosophy, even to the act of  writing itself—to explore the motions and 
contours of  Eros. She always finds it floating between things, held in the tension of  a paradox, 
never quite possible to pin down. She always finds it moving, and just out of  her reach. But if  
grasping desire itself  is elusive, much can be learned about it by watching the effects that are left 
in its wake. And although the pursuit is prone to many pitfalls such as those explored above, she 
is unequivocal that life without it would be pale and dull: indeed it would hardly be life. 
Imagine a city where there is no desire. Supposing for the moment that the inhabitants of  the city continue to 
eat, drink, and procreate in some mechanical way; still, their life looks flat. ... Few think to shun pain; none 
give gifts. . . .
A city without desire is, in sum, a city of  no imagination. Here people think only what they already know.74 
Nonetheless, reading Plato’s Phaedrus, Carson finds still more troubling effects of  eros. In the 
course of  the dialogue, Sokrates and Phaedrus find that eros presents dangers to the lover; and 
in response, that the lover can be compelled to harm the beloved. Or, he may play tricks with 
the figure of  eros itself, short-circuiting its effects to prevent his pain. 
To begin with, eros is the cause of  various “sicknesses” for the lover. As we saw in Sappho’s poem, 
eros stirs up wildly unsettling currents in the lover, tearing under her skin with both fire and ice. 
But these bittersweet sensations—the lover’s sense that something like wings are sprouting in her 
core—are eros’ greatest gifts. For the sake of  the lover’s immersion in these currents, Sokrates 
calls love a kind of  mania. “For indeed lovers themselves admit that they are sick not sane, and 
know they are not in their right minds, but they are not able to control themselves.”75
Erotic mania can lead a lover to entirely disregard reason. It can distract him so powerfully that 
he is prone to neglect his own security and health. He can become so caught up in his sense of  
lack, and so attuned to his fantasies, that he can become blind to the exigencies of  his own body 
in the “now”, or how he should comport himself:
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. . . he forgets his mother and his brothers and all his comrades, couldn’t care less if  his property is lost through 
neglect, and, in disdain of  all those proprieties and decorums whose beauty he once cherished, he is ready to 
be a slave, to sleep anywhere he is allowed, as close as possible to his desire.” 76 
These distractions lead the Greek poets to be generally dubious that eros can come to any 
good.77 But in the moment of  eros, when a person is transformed into a lover, it is not primarily 
these dangers that she fears. Instead, what the lover fears is the end of  her desire: the emptiness 
and pain that would come if  eros were to depart, its wings torn away. The fear of  this loss is part 
of  eros’ mania, and can breed ugly effects.
In Plato’s dialogue, the type of  erotic relationship that is discussed is particular to his day, but it is 
nonetheless demonstrative of  eros’ pitfalls and promises. The role of  the beloved is played by the 
paidaka or “beloved boy”; the lover is the man or erastes who pursues him. Sokrates says that an 
erastes “is of  necessity jealous”, for he sees that time will act as an enemy to his desire, removing 
his paidaka’s beautiful bloom of  youth. This jealousy can bring the erastes to attempt to control 
and restrict the boy. Driven to cling to the present of  his love affair for fear of  the future, he tries 
to freeze his paidaka in the present moment, to strong-arm time in order to save his desire:
What the conventional lover wants [from time] is to remain in the “now” of  desire at any cost, even to the 
extent of  radically damaging his beloved in order to do so. Such a lover, Sokrates says, will stunt the growth of  
his beloved in every direction that leads the boy away from direct dependence on his erastes. He will inhibit 
the boy from normal physical development in outdoor life, keeping him in shadow and cosmetics, away from 
manly toils. He will set up similar barriers to the boy’s cultural and intellectual development, lest the paidika 
grow beyond him in mind.”78
To wrench the beloved out of  time causes radical damage, because time should naturally confer 
change on the boy: growth, maturation, and self-realisation. “The people we love are never just 
as we desire them,” Carson says. “Eros is in between.”79 With that space between the lover’s 
ideal and the beloved’s real self  widening with time until the two images can no longer be held 
in the same frame, the jealous lover tries unfairly to shoe-horn the beloved back into his picture. 
As the “ideal” beloved drifts further away, the lover begins to pull the beloved out of  time; per-
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haps unwittingly, he begins to construe him as having no life-process of  his own, and little value 
in his own right. He freezes him in time like a waxen memory of  youthful beauty and innocence, 
holding the paidaka’s life ransom for the sake of  his desire. 
What happens when the hand of  the controlling lover reaches similarly toward the landscape 
and finds its blush of  unfettered potential beginning to look worn? Merchant quotes Adam 
Smith who opines that: “man is by Nature directed to correct, in some measure, that distribution 
of  things she herself  would otherwise have made,”80 as if  Nature herself  pines for a renovation 
of  the landscape as it once was, or is imagined to have been, or perhaps should have been.
The audacious extents of  the project to make something else of  the landscape, to make of  it an 
ideal beloved, are brought into sharp focus by Christine Macy and Sarah Bonnemaison in their 
book Architecture and Nature: Creating the American Landscape. They write of  the vast-scale New Deal 
project to refurbish the Tennessee River Valley as “nature tended and controlled so as to yield 
nourishment, power, and enjoyment all together:”81 an ambitious dream-scene that stretches out 
like an endless, perfect summer’s afternoon. Like Sokrates’ controlling lover, it is a plan by which 
a dominant hand seeks to “reap the fruit that is sweet to himself  for as long a time as possible.”82 
Macy and Bonnemaison cite theorist Marcia Ian, who grasps the violent sexual overtones of  
a plan to dam up the “potentially unpredictable and threatening fluidity” of  tributaries enter-
ing the valley.83 “The dams are merely the climaxes,” writes architectural journalist and editor 
Douglas Haskell in 1941. Macy and Bonnemaison spell out the explicitness of  his metaphor of  
sexual control: “[the dams] are the virile members that produce the juice (fertilizer and electric-
ity) that will inseminate the barren earth.”84 Here, the landscape is rewritten as a reliable and 
changeless provider, an eager sexual conquest, a slave. Haskell’s metaphor reads as a violent 
assault on the space of  the river valley; but more significantly, just like the jealous erastes with his 
paidaka, it launches an assault on its processes, on its existence in time. 
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What is a lover to do? In his book The End of  Nature, Bill McKibben struggles for an answer. 
Himself  an adoring lover of  nature in a culture that has been too much Casanova, he still finds 
himself  emotionally caught up in the age-old fixation on untouched space. He laments the loss 
of  “pristine places” on the Earth, places that will remain unaffected by human action and bear 
no whiff  of  humanity. Indeed, he finds most hope looking up past the Earth’s atmosphere to the 
stars of  the night sky because he reasons, quoting William Burroughs: “We do not see ourselves 
reflected there.”85  
For McKibben, nature has ended with climate change: those boundless, human-generated 
processes that threaten to unsettle the climatic conditions that have made Earth habitable and 
pleasant to inhabit, that have created the conditions for life as we know it. But as McKibben 
delineates the end of  nature in this way, calling out a kind of  new frontier of  the natural, we 
see a hint of  Humboldt’s old erotic melancholia stirring in him: “The end of  nature is a plunge 
into the unknown, fearful as much because it is unknown as because it might be hot or dry 
or whipped by hurricanes,” McKibben writes.86 We see here that by inscribing this “end” to 
nature, this limit on the extents of  its processes, he is also reestablishing a new kind of  territory 
of  the unknown in the landscape. This new unknown, as fearful as the space beyond our old 
frontiers, becomes a renewed realm in which intrepid pioneers might one more time strike out 
to redeem the world and find their own completion. In McKibben’s framework, we see that the 
impulse to divide the world into known and unknown, logical and illogical, or “the way things 
are” and “the way things should not be” still exerts itself. Negotiating between these terms, we 
can feel the currents of  eros move.
Meanwhile, in his own backyard, the invisible hand of  climate change has come to haunt 
McKibben everywhere:
I love the mountain outside my back door--the stream that runs along its flank, and the smaller stream that 
slides down a quarter-mile mossy chute, and the place where the slope flattens into an open plain of  birch and 
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oak. But I know some part of  me resists getting to know it better—for fear, weak-kneed as it sounds, of  getting 
hurt. If  I knew as well as a forester what sick trees looked like, I fear I would see them everywhere.87
Afraid that his beloved forests will be killed by acid rain and erratic weather patterns, McKibben 
concludes that “[t]here is no future in loving nature.”88 And so he comes to find himself  most 
at ease in the woods during the blankness of  winter, when the world is asleep and he cannot tell 
if  the dormant trees might be dying: “just as a sick friend, when she’s sleeping peacefully, might 
wake up without the wheeze in her lungs.”89 He has imagined himself  and his woods into a still 
life. Freezing himself  in its frozen world, we are left wondering if  he will take another breath.
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It is in response to eros’ threats—its dangers to both lover and beloved—that Phaedrus becomes 
enamoured with an idea that promises to do away with all of  its troubles. He finds the idea in 
the text of  a speech written by the Sophist Lysias, and he woos Sokrates out into the countryside 
to discuss it with him. Lysias proposes that one who is not driven by desire makes for a better 
companion. “[A] beautiful boy,” he argues, “would do better to bestow his favours on a man 
who is not in love with him than on a man who is in love with him.”90 Lysias asserts that erotic 
desire is bound to come and go; and so it is best to simply leave it out of  courtship’s equation. 
Instead, the non-lover begins the courtship without desire, “. . . not primarily cultivating the 
pleasure of  the moment but, really, the profit coming in the future . . . ,” which he imagines to 
be a long, untroubled friendship.9 As such the non-lover maintains full control of  himself  at all 
times: never falling, and growing no wings. 
The approach of  the non-lover seems benign. First, it appears to relieve the lover of  both his 
pains and his motivations toward transgression. As Carson explains, the ancient poets see the 
intrusion of  eros as unwelcome: “their metaphors for the experience [of  eros] are metaphors of  
war, disease, and bodily dissolution,” for eros stages an overthrow of  reason.92 “Change of  self  
is loss of  self  to these poets,” Carson declares.93 No reasoning person thinks to abase himself  
or to hurt someone of  whom he is fond. Therefore, avoiding eros also seems to safeguard the 
beloved. It promises a lack of  pain, and contentment seems possible. Finally, it appears that 
reason remains unchallenged.
But to Sokrates, this approach is a misapprehension of  the erotic figure, and a violation of  real-
ity.94 For it treats the whole scene involving lover and beloved not as a process in time, but as a 
false schematization. To start an affair, the non-lover “. . . stations himself  safely at an imaginary 
‘then’ and looks back upon desire from a vantage point of  emotional disengagement.”95 He 
reasons that to avoid that presupposed end, it is logical to avoid eros’ beginning, and indeed its 
whole process.
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The consequence for the beloved is that he is replaced by a frozen pretense; and the lover, in 
seeking to remain unaffected and untransformed by the experience, subverts his own potential 
to grow. Like McKibben’s frightening preference for utter stillness in the woods—for the mutual 
dormancy in which the trees give no indication of  either life or death, and in which he both 
learns no more and loves no more—it is a dead way to approach a living thing as a living thing. 
Sokrates calls the non-lover’s approach “a mortal self-control which disburses itself  in mortal 
miserly measurings.” The non-lover is never compelled to give or to pursue—never compelled. 
Carson calls it “a deadly stinginess.”96 
The non-lover hijacks the figure of  eros by writing the end over the beginning; by navigating 
the courtship according to a much deadlier kind of  fiction than that projected “what if...? that 
compels the lover in the instant of  his desire. For the non-lover decides how to act by holding up, 
between himself  and the present moment, a suppositional map drawn only of  past generalities 
and future predictions. He throws it like a lumpy, ill-fitting cloak over the figure of  his erstwhile 
beloved so that this boy could be any boy. His map bears only the most schematic resemblance to 
any present moment, revealing nothing to be learned. Exchange and real relation are subsumed 
in the script of  his lifeless play, the actions rehearsed and played out without variation until the 
final curtain.
96  Carson, Eros,50.
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The approach of  the non-lover exercises more subtle forms of  control than those flamboyant 
abductions and strong-armings that we considered earlier. The non-lover tries to safeguard 
himself  at all costs by disfiguring desire and replacing the beloved with a pretense: rather than 
meddling with eros’ parts, he takes command of  the whole structure of  the erotic experience. 
“I can see that this is going to go badly,” we can hear McKibben say to himself  as he looks at 
the woods, and then tries to evade his insecurity by setting his inclination to love them—and to 
really get to know them—aside. 
The non-loving subject eschews the reach of  eros in order to avoid setting herself  off-balance; 
forgoes its wings in order to avoid their stirrings. She aims to make stable the ground on which 
she stands and to make the boundaries of  her identity sharp and unyielding: by taking a de-
tached stance, the subject secures herself  against intrusion by the world.
As we have seen, it is an approach that appeals (momentarily, at least) to a heartbroken lover like 
McKibben. The casual lover may also be willing to try it on. Macy and Bonnemaison note that 
with the emergence of  the national parks in America comes the figure of  the nature tourist: an 
individual who can choose to place herself  within the parks’ “wildernesses” for the duration of  
a holiday or a weekend. She comes armed with a camera, a reassuring tool that is able to readily 
frame the unfamiliar spaces that she encounters: “taking a picture,” notes Susan Sontag, allows 
viewers to “take possession of  the space in which they are insecure.”97
More significant to our studies here, we can find the logic of  the non-lover also lingering in 
the character of  the cartographer, or one who navigates with a map. For like the non-lover, to 
approach the landscape brandishing a map is to throw a layer of  abstraction over its details 
and specificities. As we noted of  the Greenness Map, the Map’s representation does not leave 
room for surprise: instead it allows the future to be represented in terms of  the past, rendering 
all things evenly comparable in space and time. Locating ourselves or other things with a map 
offers a layer of  abstraction that protects us from direct confrontations with what may ultimately 
be surprising, shifting, and unpredictable terrains and environments. Using a map to mediate 
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and inform our actions in and on the landscape allows us to act from behind and through its 
abstractions, from a position of  personal protection.
Considering the effect of  mapping practice in the colonizing of  America, theorist Kathleen 
Kirby wields this criticism: 
Part of  the function of  mapping, it would seem, is to ensure that the relationship between knower and known 
remains unidirectional. The mapper should be able to ‘master’ his environment, occupy a secure and superior 
position in relation to it, without it affecting him in return.98
Cosgrove links this sense of  mastery in the mapping gaze to the God-like quality of  the aerial 
view which, as it ascends over the surface of  the earth, seems to thus transcend the earthly 
condition.99 With its aspect of  an omniscient, divine viewpoint, it is perhaps no surprise that, as 
Corner notes, “. . . maps often lead readers to believe that they are looking at complete, objec-
tive descriptions of  the land.”100 And if  we consider the mapping gaze to indeed be borrowed 
from the realm of  the divine, and therefore the eternal, it is perhaps no surprise that it valourizes 
a representation that plays at timelessness, that postures with an absolute and conclusive quality, 
and is poorly-disposed to acknowledging its limitations. 
In contrast to these ways of  thinking about the mapping gaze and what it means to accomplish, 
the perspective of  artist Michael Ashkin enters in like a breath of  air. “It is often said that 
the view from above is God-like,” he writes in his book Garden State, “but I think not.” He 
explains:  
If  God could see, it would be from all positions simultaneously, from the infinity without and from the 
infinitessimal within, from the beginning of  time until its end, an endless number of  viewpoints which, when 
summed, would equal no viewpoint at all. Rather, it would equal a complete knowledge, permanently frozen, 
devoid of  potential and, ultimately, dead. The view from above is the most human of  views, where we indulge 
in the most human of  pastimes: abstraction and simplification.” 101
Ashkin suggests that this perspective that seeks a gaze from above—the mapping gaze—is 
caught up in a broader human impulse toward abstraction and simplification. Suppose that its 
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qualities are opposing counterparts to those that he attributes to the divine gaze: if  this is true, 
the aerial view is subjective and incomplete, susceptible to change, replete with potential and, 
ultimately, part of  life. 
So far we can identify the trajectory of  the mapping gaze in the pastimes of  the cartographer, 
the tourist, and the non-lover. As we have seen, what it gains is some stability and security for the 
subject; what it misses is the possibility of  a direct and deep engagement in the present moment, 
in any present moment, as it wrests relation out of  time.
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“[I]n place of  the endless becoming of  life, the intellect puts homogeneous and immobile states; 
. . .  it sees change as a surface ripple on that which is fundamentally immobile; it reduces the 
mobile to the immobile,”102 writes Elizabeth Grosz in her book The Nick of  Time. The book is an 
investigation of  Darwin, Nietzsche and Bergson’s writings that seeks to restore “a remembrance 
of  what we have forgotten—not just the body, but that which makes it possible and which limits 
its actions: the precarious, accidental, contingent, expedient, striving, dynamic status of  life in a 
messy, complicated, resistant, brute world of  materiality, a world regulated by the exigencies, the 
forces, of  space and time.”103 She seeks to understand anew “the nature of  bodies, in biological 
evolution, that opens them up . . . to political, cultural, and conceptual evolution;” to address 
“how biological complexity impels the complications and variability of  culture itself.”104
Her reading of  Bergson focuses on life’s different strategies—how bodies perceive, act and 
know—and the ways that these different strategies position themselves in relation to space and 
time. And here, in Bergson’s characterization of  the intellect, we find those pastimes of  abstrac-
tion and simplification called out by Ashkin, operating as hallmark tactics of  human (and other 
vertebrate) life. 
“Intelligence is a tendency . . . [that] directs itself  outward to the regulation and ordering of  the 
material world,”105 notes Grosz. “[I]t lacks any immediacy of  contact with materiality, with any 
objects in particular.”106 Instead, it approaches objects from the outside, oriented to assessing 
how it might make use of  them: “It is a knowledge primarily linked to action, to the highlighting 
of  those characteristics of  objects that will best facilitate our action, and to the obscuring of  all 
others.”107 As such the intellect is only able to produce “snapshots, perspectives, on the object, 
which, however much they are magnified and proliferated, still never manage to capture the 
specificity and details of  the object.”108
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But as an invention of  life, of  evolution, the intellect brings a unique and powerful capacity to 
“extract things of  interest for the living being from the objects of  the world.”109 For the intellect 
carries “its past along with its present in order to modify its future;”110 it opens the body to the 
“ability to choose among alternative behaviors, the capacity to discern a preference for one 
mode of  activity over another in a particular situation.” In so doing, it opens the subject to 
learning and material invention; it gives the body the ability to modify itself  from the outside, to 
extend itself  through the creation of  tools. Its inventions allow it to outstrip the rate of  biological 
evolution, opening “a path of  evolutionary development that now includes not only the natural 
environment, but also a social, cultural, and technological universe, one open to continual aug-
mentation and transformation by conventions and inventions.”2 Its actions “not only satisf[y] 
. . . needs but create new ones:”3
Consciousness and intelligence open up the material world to the play of  virtuality. Consciousness highlights 
our possible action on things; it is a measure of  our virtual interest in things, the gap between the thing and its 
(newly emergent) uses. It measures the difference between the real object and the potential to use it in a variety 
of  unexpected ways. . . Consciousness, and intelligence, which is its correlate, are bound up with representa-
tion, which delays, complicates, and frees behavior . . . This subtracts from the object most of  its features and 
details, but it also adds to the object the possibility of  new connections, new contexts, new uses.4
So while the intellect presents a remarkable opening to novelty, Bergson calls it “an external and 
empty knowledge:”
What is new escapes it, for it strives only to extend what it knows, not to question how it knows; intelligence 
projects onto the unknown what it has already confirmed, what is capable of  being extended or elaborated, 
what has knowable consequences, what is able to be repeated, controlled, predicted. It applies itself  to things, 
but only from the outside, reconstituting their parts but understanding nothing of  the interpenetrating totality 
from which these parts are derived. It is unable to enter into life in its own terms.115
To render matter useable to itself, the intellect’s mechanistic approach must freeze that which 
it finds, render qualities as quantities, break time’s flow into measured segments that can 
only be perceived retrospectively. While this tactic is sympathetic to the study of  inert matter, 
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“[p]roblems arise when this mechanistic approach is carried over to the study of  the living.”6 
For of  the knowledge that it can provide of  a living object, Bergson says it “becomes altogether 
relative to our faculty of  action. It is no more than a symbolic verity.”7 Indeed, the intellect is 
bewildered when it turns to the living, for it is “not made to think evolution, in the proper sense 
of  the word—that is to say, the continuity of  a change that is pure mobility:”118
[I]ntelligence, though infinitely perfectible, is nevertheless limited; in particular, Bergson claims, it is unable to 
think two central facets of  the continuity of  duration: the multiplicity of  qualitatively different elements and 
their blurring interpenetration. It is unable to proceed without clear lines of  demarcation, discontinuity, and 
boundaries, without unambiguous forms of  identity. This means that intelligence is not adept in its dealings 
with lived continuity, experience, subjectivity, sociality, and all that has to do with life itself  . . . 119
The intellect produces—and then can only function in—mapped space.
6  Grosz, Nick, 240. 
  Ibid., 240.
  Ibid., 232.
9  Ibid., 232.
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“Mapping becomes a technology advancing, and the very hallmark of, a larger cultural order premised on 
cleanly distinguishing between entities in the natural environment, the psychic environment, and finally, the 
social environment.”120
Dangerous things can happen when we find ourselves beyond the borders of  mapped space, 
without its familiar delineations and absolute reference points. 
One remarkable consequence of  navigating unfamiliar territory, attests Kathleen Kirby, is that 
we are prone to be unable to see clearly what is actually there. Instead, our tendency is to try to 
reduce the unfamiliar to the familiar, to read the new in terms of  the already-known. In the set-
tling of  America, cartographers tended to render the new environments that they encountered 
according to their existing cultural conventions: “[J.B.] Harley demonstrates the tendency of  
early American cartographers ‘to obliterate the uniqueness of  the American landscape in favour 
of  a stereotype reflecting a European sensibility of  the natural world,’ ” she writes. 2
This misapprehension bears unsettling consequences. For if  James Corner describes maps as 
“. . . projections, renderings of  reality that are drawn from and thrown over the world ... [that] 
make visible what is otherwise invisible,”22 Kirby reminds us that their recasting of  space, the 
representation that they throw over the world, can also render invisible that which is really there. 
And in time, in America, this “rendering invisible” amounted to a wiping-out of  difference in 
real terms: “Standardized ‘Man’, like mapping iconography, applied its own culturally specific 
standards as if  they were indeed universal to the end that actual otherness was erased. Subjects, 
like places, were homogenized in favour of  the generic . . .”23
Kirby investigates further this real erasure in her study of  explorer Cabeza de Vaca, finding 
disastrous consequences for living things: 
120  Kirby, Re: Mapping, 49.
2  Ibid., 46.
22 Corner, “Aerial Representation,” .
123  Kirby, Re: Mapping, 46.
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“As de Vaca’s testimonies relate, the Europeans . . . needed to maintain the Native Americans as external 
in order to reinforce their own subjectivity. By attributing inferiority to the Native American people and their 
spatial practices, these texts functioned to concretize individualism and ensure the Native Americans’ exclusion 
from it. Mapping acted to distinguish “self ” from “other”: in early America, cartography was the measure 
between human and non-human, civilized and savage . . . The solid lines that cartography draws between the 
subject and the land also reinforce the lines drawn between European white subjects and Others.124
Kirby describes the lines drawn by cartography as “solid,” and they are so in two ways: first, 
they strive to be absolute and impenetrable, and second, as they strike out their decisive orders 
and organizations, they anchor themselves with a relative permanence. “The power of  aerial 
imaging lies less in its descriptive capacity . . . than in its conditioning of  how one sees and acts 
within the built environment,”25 Corner writes; and as we consider the consequences of  this 
observation for Native Americans we find that it carries an ominous truth. Cast as inhabitants 
of  the lost frontier lands, and then excluded from National Parks, the disappearance of  many 
became a foregone conclusion. Writer and activist Rebecca Solnit recounts a story that brings 
the real effects of  this conceptual erasure into sharp focus: 
I think it was 1980, Julia and four of  us on business for our tribe [seeking federal recognition in Washington] 
went to the Smithsonian and found the California museum exhibits, then Yosemite . . . It had a little statement 
on the side, and it left off  with “It’s very sad today. There’s no more Yosemite Indians.” Period. I said, “Let’s 
go down there and talk to the people at the desk about this statement.  . . . So I say, “Well, I hate to disturb 
you, but I’m a Yosemite Indian, and we’re here on business for our tribe.” And [the woman at the desk] caught 
her breath and said, “Ohhh . . .” 126
Getting used to the detached cartographic perspective and its seemingly solid lines, we begin to 
let it stand in for the real conditions of  life. When the map explicitly becomes a tool for manage-
ment, such as in the case of  the Greenness Map, to what degree are we taking the map to be 
the land, acting on life’s profuse detail and constant change as if  it is indeed reducible to a series 
of  static, abstract phenomena? To what degree can we really reduce life’s irreconcilable differ-
ence to comparable quantities, its proliferating and elaborative forces to conservative agendas: 
reservation and conservation areas, reserves and preserves? And to what degree are we able (or 
willing) to account for the costs to life of  trying? 
124  Kirby, Re: Mapping, 49.
25  Corner, “Aerial Represenation,”6.
26  Rebecca Solnit. “The Postmodern Old West” in Storming the Gates of Paradise : Landscapes for Politics (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007), 36-3. 
99
It seems that if  we are on one hand prone, when travelling without a map, not to see what is ac-
tually there—to impose a foreign and inappropriate order onto differences that rightly demand 
acknowledgement and more careful attention—we are otherwise prone to perceive a complete 
lack of  order, and perhaps even a lack of  “things.” This tendency is expressed strikingly in some 
of  the terms that we use to describe space whose purpose we cannot quite determine, or to 
which we attribute little value, usually where non-human processes predominate. We call these 
landscapes waste spaces, empty spaces, or open spaces. Similarly, to call out buffer zones, set-
backs, and margins hints at nothing of  what may be present or going on these spaces (although 
there is often vegetation, habitats). Conceptualized as containing neither order nor perhaps 
even matter in their own right, these unnamed or externalized spaces read like spongy, chaotic 
voids. Our “empty” namings render them as accidents or considerations of  formatting: like 
“pages intentionally left blank” in a book, pages torn out, or the white spaces left by gracious 
typesetters to graphically give our eyes space to rest. 
James Romm, in his book The Edges of  the Earth in Ancient Thought, supplies some fascinating de-
scriptions of  what ancient explorers perceive in the space beyond the oikumene, outside of  that 
coherent territory conceptually stabilized by representation. One travel log reportedly recounts 
that in the ocean outside the oikumene:
“. . .the surface of  the sea does not extend into the deep, but the soil is barely covered by a little bit of  water . 
. . sea monsters swim among the sluggish and lazy ships . . . A dark fog enshrouds the air as if  in a kind of  
cloak, and clouds hide the face of  the deep always, and this veil remains throughout the whole of  the darkened 
day.“ 127
Another journal, probably describing a voyage beyond the Pillars of  Heracles at the Western 
edge of  the Mediterranean and into the North Atlantic, finds a welter of  elements in which it 
is impossible to act: 
“In these regions obtained neither earth as such, nor sea, nor air, but a kind of  mixture of  these . . . earth, 
sea, and everything else is held in suspension; this substance is like a fusion of  them all, and can neither be 
trod upon nor sailed upon.” 128
The perception of  such an undifferentiated jumble seems naive. But Kirby finds in one of  
Samuel de Champlain’s log entries a similar sense of  elemental disarray. “The land he faced 
2  Romm, Edges of the Earth, 2
2  Ibid., 22
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itself  appeared to have some of  the fluid characteristics of  this world of  water, floating ice, 
obscuring fog and darkness,” she notes. It “appears chaotic and unstable, moving in its own 
unpredictable logic.”29 Champlain writes:
The most self-possessed would have lost all judgement in such a juncture; even the greatest navigator in the 
world. What alarmed us still more [than the ice] was the short distance we could see, and the fact that night 
was coming on, and that we could not make a shift of  a quarter of  a league without finding a bank or some 
ice . . .10
Void, chaotic or fundamentally unstable, unmapped space seems to elude our perceptive facul-
ties and therefore eludes clear representation. Cosgrove notes that Lewis and Clark’s expedition 
into Louisiana Territory in 1804 also reveals the challenge to representation precipitated by “. . 
. the inability of  words and language to convey the sheer difference of  discovery . . .”3 encoun-
tered in unmapped space: 
The explorers’ journals indicate a slow fragmentation and eventual collapse of  language in the face of  
overwhelming difference in the West. Sentence structure, syntax, and descriptive language all broke down as 
the expedition penetrated spaces that had been blank on the European map.12
With this loss of  perceptual and representational aptitude, a third consequence of  travel without 
a map becomes apparent: one gets lost. These days it can take some effort to be truly lost, to 
lose all reference to mapped space or the absolute geographies of  latitude and longitude. But 
exploring a forgotten urban fringe, artist Michael Ashkin discovers a sense of  what the experi-
ence is like: 
Yesterday, beyond the Conrail tracks, I wandered out onto a large landfill covered with tall dense reed grass. 
Within minutes of  entering, I found myself  disoriented, lost in a labyrinth of  meandering, subdividing paths. 
I encountered few landmarks, only sporadic vehicle carcasses, stripped, battered, and ominous. I found my way 
out only after encountering twice the same green Toyota. 
Today, I recall the hedge maze at Chatsworth in Yorkshire. Losing my way in that well-tended garden was 
a more controlled experience. Yet now I believe stories that those lost in garden mazes have occasionally 
129  Kirby, Re: Mapping, 4.
30  Ibid., 4.
3  Cosgrove, 206.
32  Ibid., 206-20.
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become paranoid, committing indiscretions and violence. An unmappable world is a terrifying and maddening 
prospect. 1
To be lost, Kirby says, is to “actually be in the surroundings, incapable of  separating one’s self  
from them in a larger objective representation.”34 It is “something of  a crisis of  differentiation, 
a dysfunction of  the logic ensuring ordered space.”35 Ashkin describes it as tied up in the panic 
of  not knowing how one got to where one is, and not having any strategies—beyond trial and 
error—for how to get out. But it is something more than this, too. 
“In spite of  his long co-habitation with the Indians,” Kirby observes, “de Vaca remains ‘lost’ 
throughout his journey. He feels lost even when the Indians he accompanies are perfectly ori-
ented, because his concept of  orientation relies on separating himself  from a place, rather than 
becoming integrally involved with it . . .”36 In de Vaca’s case, we can see that having a strategy 
to get out is not enough: the trouble is that he can assemble no sense of  where he is.
In their lack of  representation, unmapped spaces seem to defy logic, even to tend toward a 
kind of  fluidity. But as for the madness that Ashkin hints they may cause us to feel, Kirby finds 
more at play than just a fear of  the unknown. She suggests that the indistinguishable quality of  
unmapped space is not just terrifying in its own right, but because, as Freud writes, “the form 
for the environment that the self  produces will recursively dictate the shape of  the self.”37 If  
this is true, then in an environment that we perceive as formless, where we cannot delineate the 
boundaries between things, we lose the sense of  our own edges. “Graphically, the ‘individual’ 
might be pictured as a closed circle; its smooth contours ensure its clear division from its loca-
tion, as well as assuring its internal coherence and consistency,”138 Kirby writes. When travelling 
without a map, then, in territories that we cannot grasp with a cartographic eye, it is not only the 
the space around us and the things in it that appear incomprehensible and obscure: we ourselves 
start to come apart.
33  Ashkin, Garden State, 6.
134  Kirby, Re: Mapping, 4.
35  Ibid., 49.
36  Ibid., 49.
3  Ibid., 46.
3  Ibid., 45.
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What is this mode of  perception, so different from ordinary perception that it is well described as madness?19 
 - Carson, Eros the Bittersweet
Both preceding and exceeding the intellect, Bergson identifies other strategies that life has de-
vised for framing the world: modes of  survival and, to varying degrees, means of  self-overcom-
ing. For all life is “a struggle to provisionally remake matter . . . the introduction of  a spark of  
indeterminacy into an otherwise grindingly determinable universe.”140
Life’s simplest strategy he calls torpor: this is the hallmark tactic of  plants, which primarily 
strive to collect resources while remaining immobile. Another strategy is instinct. Bergson finds 
instinct most clearly identified in the behaviours of  insects, whose actions are direct responses 
to stimuli, absolute immersions in the present moment without the capacity for reflection or 
choice, without awareness of  past or future. 
We have already explored the tactics of  the intellect: a response to life developed by vertebrates 
that allows the subject to elaborate itself  through outward abstraction and inventive extensions 
of  itself  into the material world. 
A fourth strategy, which now becomes important, is that which Bergson calls intuition: a prin-
ciple that Grosz describes as in between intelligence and instinct, or their return toward each 
other: 
[Intuition] derives from intelligence its capacity for abstraction and generalization, and from instinct its 
sympathetic apprehension of  and openness to life. Intuition is “disinterested, self-conscious” instinct; equally, 
it can be understood as intelligence now attuned to itself  and to the specificities of  life. Akin to an aesthetic 
rather than a scientific understanding, intuition is the close, intimate, internal comprehension of  and immer-
sion in the durational qualities of  life.141 
39  Carson, Eros, 52. 
40  Grosz, Nick, 29.
4  Ibid., 234
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Grosz makes clear that intuition is not a replacement of  the intellect, for the intellect’s faculties 
are vital to life, and even to intuition.42 It “is not a resistance to science, but rather, a plea for 
a more direct and unmediated relation to objects and to the world of  matter, an augmentation 
of  science . . . It is a contemplation or observation that opens up worlds to us, rather than 
narrowing the object down to our potential concerns.”43 Its focus is not toward measuring our 
potential action in the world: it does not look at the world as a potential tool for itself.  Rather, 
“[it] involves both a lessening of  the intellect’s grip on the object’s future use and a deepening 
of  its capacity to scour and address the multiplicity of  its other (nonutilitarian) qualities.”44 
As such, “[i]ntuition returns to the real the fullness and interconnectedness that intelligence 
subtracts from it.”45 It is able to embrace this fullness of  life through an “ . . . immersion in 
objects and the world directly, internally, without mediation.”46 Rather than arresting objects 
out of  time in order to apprehend them, intuition arrests the subject’s own outward action and 
immerses itself  in an inward glance.
Intuition is not an exploration of  the unknown (this is the task of  intellect, to render the unknown known or 
knowable), but a finding of  oneself  in the unknown, an immersion in its specificity, a negotiation with its 
newness. It can be considered a mode of  being lost in an unfamiliar element to which one must adjust through 
an understanding from within. 
At the very beginning of  this chapter, considering different approaches for defining green, we 
came across another incidence of  immersion. “Green is the colour of  the sea,” one voice in that 
definition declared; and we identified that it spoke with the singularity of  a lover, from a position 
of  immersion, floating in greenness, insensible to where the sensation might end in space or 
time. Compared to the eye of  a cartographer or a hunter, its perspective did not measure itself  
relative to other things, but instead found itself  in the middle of  the moment, in the middle of  
the green sea, looking in.
What we found later about the essence of  the erotic experience for the lover also echoes. For 
eros resolves itself  in an internal glance; it lives in a sudden and immersive apprehension of  
difference. Carson writes: 
42  Grosz notes that intuition “requires the mediation of intellect, language, representation to be crystallized, communicated, 
to become a form of knowledge.” Nick, 23. 
43  Ibid., 234.
44  Ibid, 234.
45  Ibid., 235.
46  Ibid., 235.
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“As you handle [the incursion of  eros] you come into contact with what is inside you, in a sudden and startling 
way. You perceive what you are, what you lack, what you could be. . . .  Something is lifting you toward an 
understanding so complete and clear it makes you jubilant. This mood is no delusion, in Sokrates belief. It is 
a glance down into time . . .” 147
The understanding that Sappho accesses through eros emerges as an inner comprehension of  
her own and others’ immersion in life, which is change: it is a revelation of  what is and what 
could be. Eros is the process by which she senses some inexpressible quality in her beloved; she 
senses herself  green. She apprehends the man next to her beloved by saying “if  I were you”, 
provoking herself  to see him through her own sympathetic becoming. Grosz again: 
Intuition is a trajectory that generates a variety of  forms, a variety of  modes of  sympathy, inner apprehen-
sion, or coincidence. It is a mode of  direct contact or community with the object, a provisional coincidence 
with it that precludes projection, mastery, or judgment: “We call intuition here the sympathy by which one 
is transported into the interior of  an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently 
inexpressible in it.148
While it is by no means synonymous with intuiton, eros nonetheless presents itself  as akin to 
intuition, perhaps as one of  its modes of  sympathy and inner apprehension: we find Sokrates 
and Bergson speaking about eros and intuition in some similar ways. Both processes seem to aim 
at the core of  the living. In Phaedrus, Sokrates tells us that eros is a recollection of  divine beauty, 
or “a glimpse of  a god.”49 Bergson seeks in intuition “a true empiricism which purposes . . . to 
probe more deeply into its life, and by a kind of  spiritual auscultation, to feel its soul palpitate 
. . .”150
These glimpses that are gained through eros and intuition both involve a plunging into time; or 
more specifically, into the flow of  time that Bergson calls duration: 
To think intuitively is to think in duration. . . . The intuition we refer to . . . bears above all upon internal 
duration. It grasps succession which is not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the uninterrupted prolongation 
of  the past into the present which is already blending into the future. It is the direct vision of  the mind by the 
mind—151
4  Carson, Eros, 52-53.
4  Grosz, Nick, 23. 
49  Carson, Eros, 53 .
50  Grosz, Nick, 23.
5 Ibid., 235.
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Although Sokrates understands very differently what is exposed by eros’ plunge into time (for 
his ancient cosmology describes, in the moment of  eros, a remembrance of  beautiful realities 
once known by the soul) Carson describes the moment of  desire championed by Sokrates as 
having a similar immersion in time’s flow: “The ‘now’ of  desire is a shaft sunk into time and 
emerging into timelessness,” she explains. “When you enter ‘now’, you remember what it is like 
to be really alive.”52
Intuition is “a growth from within” oriented toward the future, to lines of  flight; eros is the 
growth of  wings inside the lover to make more of  him, providing a glimpse of  what he means 
to be:  
“For intuition the essential is change . . . Intuition, bound up to a duration, which is growth, perceives in it 
an uninterrupted continuity of  unforeseen novelty.”15 
Finally, Sokrates calls eros a madness “conferred as a gift of  the gods” that is capable of  bringing 
“the greatest of  good things.”54 In love with eros itself, and the destabilizing, enlivening differ-
ence that sets its wings in motion, Carson tells us that Sokrates seeks “to assimilate [the ‘now’ of  
desire] in such a way that it prolongs itself  over the whole of  life, and beyond.”55 
Like eros’ mad leap, an immersion in intuition’s forces demands a loosening of  control, a disrup-
tion of  the intellect’s tentative structures, “a provisional incomprehension.” The profit to be 
gained is “ . . . the generation of  a new series of  impulses which may help modify our relations 
to the world,”56 an opening to more complete forms of  knowledge. For intuition is “. . . directed 
to the apprehension of  the whole, a whole that exists only in duration, as becoming.”57 In other 
words, it is directed toward a comprehension of  the living: 
[Intuition is] one of  the biological contingencies that mark all of  life, a tendency, more or less active or dor-
mant, whose function is not synthesis but an acknowledgment of  a mode of  belonging to, immersion in, being 
part of  a larger whole, a whole that cannot be totalized in a single force but that coheres through its conformity 
to the principles of  differences and divergence.
52  Carson, Eros,5.
53  Grosz, Nick, 236.
54  Carson, Eros,55.
55  Ibid., 53. 
56  Grosz, Nick, 23.
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Earlier I alluded that the satellite view is erotic; that it is built into a geometry that mirrors 
Sappho’s geometry of  eros. If  the satellite allows us to participate in an erotic understanding, an 
internal sympathy immersed in duration, we are now better positioned to see what that might 
be. 
The “now” of  eros begins with an apprehension that there is something inexpressible and 
fascinating about the landscape. For as we have seen in many guises, humanity is inclined to 
approach the whole earth, parts of  it, or its landscapes, as a lover. Looking to the satellite, like 
Sappho looks to the man next to her beloved, an internal sympathy with it strikes us: it might 
be our own becoming-intellectual, or becoming-machine. In this impulse to immersion, to ap-
prehension from the inside, we come into contact with our own growth, our own uninterrupted 
process flowing from “the past into the present which is already blending into the future,” in 
Bergson’s words. “What I find beneath these clear-cut crystals and this superficial congelation 
is a continuity of  flow comparable to no other flowing I have ever seen,”158 he says. In Grosz’s 
assessment, finding this flow is critical to the elaboration of  life in all its forms: including biologi-
cal, social, cultural, and political life: 
The more clearly we understand our temporal location as beings who straddle the past and the future without 
the security of  a stable and abiding present, the more mobile our possibilities are, and the more transformation 
becomes conceivable.159
But in our return to the intellect and its processes of  representation, we primarily revert to its 
forms of  control, to its stable models, failing to recognize their limitations—what Bergson calls 
their solely “symbolic verities.” We act the non-lover, as if  there was no desire present in our 
relation to the world, as if  relation to living things could be understood as simply mechanistic, 
reduced to general snapshots that could be substituted for each other and rearranged. And we 
act the jealous erastes: considering the superficial features of  the landscape through the satellite’s 
abstractions, bent on the land’s greenness while tending to forget or ignore the complexities of  
its change in time. 
5  Grosz, Nick, 23.
59  Ibid., 4.
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To illustrate the problem of  treating life without regard to time, of  treating life according to its 
symbolic representation, Sokrates uses as a parable the gardens of  Adonis. Carson explains: 
The gardens of  Adonis were a feature of  Athenian religious observance in the fifth century. During annual 
rituals in honour of  Adonis, seeds of  wheat, barley, and fennel were sown in small pots and forced to grow 
unseasonably fast for enjoyment during the eight days of  the festival. The plants had no roots. They bloomed 
briefly, withered almost at once, and were pitched out days after the festival. Their hectic lives were meant to 
reflect that of  Adonis himself, plucked in the bloom of  his youth by the goddess Aphrodite, dead in his prime 
as a result.160
It is a practice of  ritual gardening; and it concerns Plato that we seem attracted to rituals and 
other simulations “that take place outside the real time of  people’s lives, in a suspended moment 
of  control.”6 Sokrates asks Phaedrus: 
Do you think a sensible gardener, who cared for his seeds and wished to see them bear fruit, would plant them 
with serious intention in the garden of  Adonis in high summer and take pleasure in watching them grow 
beautiful in a space of  eight days? Or would he do that sort of  thing, when he did it at all, only for fun or 
festival?162
Carson interprets: 
Consider the plants of  Adonis, forced too quickly to their akme, held at the peak of  bloom while the festival 
lasts, discarded the next day: this is an image of  how the conventional erastes uses his paidaka. It is an image 
of  one human being exploiting another by controlling the time of  his life. 163
As Carson illustrates, there is something serious that separates the symbolic representation of  
growth and death that takes place in the gardens of  Adonis from the real playing-out of  these 
processes. What is missing from the ritual garden is life itself. Sokrates’ parable, therefore, is 
a cautionary tale for anyone who aims to be a serious lover or gardener. “The person who 
mistakes symbol for reality,” Carson warns, “is left with a dead garden.”64 
60  Carson, Eros,4.
6  Ibid., 42.
62  Ibid., 42.
63  Ibid., 43.
64  Ibid., 46.
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green : 
 - adjective
(of a memory) not fading
freshly slaughtered or still raw: green meat
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According to Genesis, life began in a perfect garden. In Eden, our original and ideal home, 
we lived without painful toil or death.1 We wanted for nothing; grace and ease defined our 
existence. Then through our error, we were sent into exile. The story is unequivocal that we are 
permanently locked-out: in the Hebrew text, Eden is located miqqedem, which can mean in a for-
mer time, or in the East.2 Neither reading leaves room for hope: one sets the Garden sometime 
other than “now”, and the other locates it somewhere other than “here.” Nevertheless, we have 
been trying to repair our blunder ever since. 
The notion of  a return to Eden—a recovery of  the Garden—rumbles over the land like a low, 
drawn-out growl of  thunder. “The Recovery of  Eden story,” writer Carolyn Merchant declares, 
“is the mainstream narrative of  Western culture . . . perhaps the most important mythology 
humans have developed to make sense of  their relationship to the earth.”3 To be clear, she 
calls it “most important” for its most remarkable and enduring effects. With its promise of  an 
impossibly frictionless, untroubled existence, Eden always remains surpassingly attractive and 
perpertually out of  reach. It beckons forever: a perfect object of  desire.
In her book Recovering Eden, Merchant examines the ways in which the desire for Eden has 
shaped Western culture; and in particular, the colonization of  the Americas. Innocent as it 
seems, she shows how it has in practice been a highly problematic cultural narrative, used to 
justify a manifest (Euro-centric, patriarchal, anthropocentric) destiny of  dominance, control, 
and exclusion. She also argues that the notion of  reestablishing Eden still exerts an indomitable 
cultural force. One can point to the continued and widespread practice of  religious rituals 
aimed at atoning for the error that brought about our expulsion from the Garden, but Merchant 
claims that the story is simply broadly embedded in Western culture. Indeed, the Greenness 
Map that we explored in the previous chapter can be read as something of  a vision for an Eden 
redux: a tilled-and-kept world-garden, more controlled and less threatening than the wilder, 
unmapped land that preceded it. At every turn, we find evidence that the Garden’s impression 
lingers freshly in us, an achingly green memory that seems to accompany us always, exerting its 
  Throughout this chapter, I rely most heavily on Francis Landy for his Biblical scholarship on Eden; in particular “Two 
Versions of Paradise”, in Paradoxes of Paradise: Identity and Difference in the Song of Songs (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983)
  Landy, Paradoxes,191.
3  Merchant, Reinventing Eden, 3.
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pull. “Consciously at times,” Merchant states, “unconsciously at others, we search for ways to 
reclaim our loss.”4 
Merchant calls for new narratives. The story of  Eden itself  provides fertile ground to reconsider 
and recontextualise our relationship to the Garden: our debt to it, “our loss”, the terms of  its 
passing-behind us. Ultimately, this line of  research may help us to rethink what it is that we 
want back.
  Merchant, Reinventing, 3.
  Some authors whose efforts to do this I found intriguing include Francis Landy, Robert Alter, Phyllis Trible, Kenneth 
Helphand,  Alessandro Scafi. 
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[Genesis 2:8] And the LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the east; and there he put the man whom he 
had formed. [9] And out of  the ground the LORD God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight 
and good for food, the tree of  life also in the midst of  the garden, and the tree of  the knowledge of  good and 
evil. [10] A river flowed out of  Eden to water the garden, and there it divided and became four rivers.
[15] The LORD God took the man and put him in the garden of  Eden to till it and keep it. 
[16] And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, “You may freely eat of  every tree of  the garden; 
[17] but of  the tree of  the knowledge of  good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of  it you 
shall die.”
[25] And the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed.
The description of  Eden is brief, and slim on details. There are trees that are pleasant to sight 
and good for food; but flowers are conspicuously absent. Biblical scholar Francis Landy ex-
plains: “Flowers, like spices, are not found in the garden of  Eden. They are indices of  time, 
unlike the trees ‘lovely to look on,’ whose beauty is constant.” Indeed, the Eden of  Genesis is 
not a sumptuous, decadent “paradise”: rather, it is a restrained garden. The fruit available for 
food is but sweet, simple and insubstantial nourishment. The senses are not flooded, but rather 
awaken slowly and carefully throughout the tale, emerging one by one.9  
Apparently, some measured effort is required from the humans to maintain the garden’s bounty: 
to tend the dark trees and their sufficient clusters of  ripe fruit. But it seems the fruit is always 
present for their sustenance (and presumably, the animals’), perhaps miraculously reemerging 
as it is picked, tireless as the springs that feed the garden with water.10 There is no change in the 
7  Eleanour Sinclair Rohde, Garden-craft in the Bible, and other essays (Freeport, N.Y : Books for Libraries Press, 1967), 
1-16.
7  Landy, Paradoxes, 193.
8  Ibid., 191.
9  Phyllis Trible., “A Love Story Gone Awry” in God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, Overtures to Biblical Theology. (Philedelphia: 
University Fortress Press, 1978) 72-13.  
0  Jean Delumeau, History of Paradise: The Garden of Eden in Myth and Tradition. (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
2000), 130. 
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seasons, for “rain, like death and time, is outside the garden.”11 There is no place for winter’s rest 
or spring’s flowering. Perhaps a benevolent creator would have arranged it just so, a garden like 
a still life, sparing those tender humans the bright explosions of  colour and heady perfumes with 
which most plants advertise their sexualities as they shake off  darker, cooler days. 
Of  the plants in the Garden, there are but two details that are brought into some focus. We learn 
that Eden contains a fig tree, as it provides the leaves that Adam and Eve use to clothe them-
selves after the Fall. The tree of  life is mentioned only in passing; but the story lingers for a while 
at the tree of  the knowledge of  good and evil, that forbidden tree on which the plot turns. 
  Landy, Paradoxes, 19.
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[3:1] Now the serpent was more subtle than any other wild creature that the LORD God had made. He said 
to the woman, “Did God say, `You shall not eat of  any tree of  the garden’?” 
[2] And the woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of  the fruit of  the trees of  the garden; [3] but God 
said, `You shall not eat of  the fruit of  the tree which is in the midst of  the garden, neither shall you touch it, 
lest you die.’”
[4] But the serpent said to the woman, “You will not die. [5] For God knows that when you eat of  it your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”
[6] So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the 
tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of  its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, 
and he ate. [7] Then the eyes of  both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig 
leaves together and made themselves aprons.
Much has been made of  the human folly that brought about the Fall, and much of  the blame 
has been pinned on Eve’s desire to be wise. History has alternately demonized or tried to re-
deem Eve’s actions—and implicitly, women in general, who have been disproportionately made 
to stand trial for them.12 Traditionally Eve has been cast as disobedient and greedy, aspiring to 
a higher station than she should; while in some contemporary feminist readings she is cast as a 
liberator.  
In Mark Twain’s satirical but poignant Diaries of  Adam and Eve, he fashions Eve as a keen ob-
server: a scientist well before her experimentation with the fruit that causes the fall. Twain’s Eve 
notices, for example, that although the tigers in the Garden live on strawberries, their teeth seem 
to be designed to eat something altogether different. She has the sense that things are poised to 
change.13
Reading the passage about Eve and the fruit, however, I wonder if  it is fair to consider Eve’s 
ambition to be wise as the culprit for the fall—as the impetus for the changes which are subse-
quently wrought on the world. For it is striking, in the verse where the narrator describes Eve’s 
  Trible, God, 73.
13  Mark Twain, Eve’s Diary.
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decision to eat the fruit, that the desire for wisdom comes last: it is the last reason given to us to 
explain Eve’s action:
[6] So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the 
tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of  its fruit and ate;
Furthermore, if  there is perfect contentment in the garden, how is it that Eve can come want for 
such a thing as knowledge? How does she come to discover her lack? Since the desire for wisdom 
arises as her last thought, an afterthought, could it have been a little earlier that everything 
started to shift?
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[6] So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes - 
Before Eve notes that the fruit is “desired to make one wise,” the narrator tells us, she is struck 
by its delight. 
We already know that Eden was made to contain “every tree that is pleasant to sight.” Here 
again we are told that Eve saw that the tree was “a delight to the eyes.” This repetition underlines 
that the tree of  the knowledge of  good and evil is like every tree in the garden. The difference is 
that the first instance relates what God sees; the second time, the sensation is Eve’s.
We are lead to believe that Eden is a place that life could have remained forever, harmonious 
and without trouble, if  humans had simply been “obedient.” This notion of  a frictionless ex-
istence has proven irresistible to the human imagination, even if  we can hardly fathom such a 
lulling sameness and stability. Each perpetually-green tree in the Garden is “pleasant to sight”: 
they are all equivalently nice. Goethe, in his Theory of  Colours, declares that when looking at 
green “[t]he eye experiences a distinctly grateful impression . . . the eye and the mind repose . . . 
as upon a simple [primary] colour. The beholder has neither the wish nor the power to imagine 
a state beyond it. Hence for rooms to live in constantly, the green colour is most generally 
selected.”14 Eden is just this kind of  flatly green enclosure, a measured and artless economy of  
the pleasant. 
Now in early Genesis, in its first tale of  creation, God spends many of  his days occupied with di-
vision. He divides light from darkness, heavens from earth, land from water. This differentiation 
is what creates the conditions for life, bringing it into motion. In the Garden, despite its variety, 
the trees are all given a similar bearing. They are all good for food and pleasant to sight. Had 
they remained uniformly appealing, none more appetizing or intriguing than the next, it seems 
likely that nothing would ever have happened there. But God sets one apart, and the snake has 
hardly to bring Eve’s attention to it in order to unsettle Eden’s perfect balance. 
1  Goethe, Theory of Colours, 316.
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God tells Eve that eating from the tree of  knowledge will cause death; the snake says it will not. 
But since death does not exist in the Garden, it isn’t clear that God’s threat has any meaning to 
Eve. And if  Eden is a place of  perfect contentment, is wisdom (also unknown to Eve) really so 
captivating? Since she is innocent of  both, there is reason to think that she might look with equal 
ambivalence on death and wisdom. 
If  this is the case, then fear and greed are not the drivers of  the story. Rather, the snake’s success 
in engaging Eve is simply that he points out the tree’s difference.
“Is it true that you cannot eat from any tree?” the snake prompts Eve. 
“No,” she replies. “All but one tree. All but this tree.” 
“So the trees are all the same except this tree,” the snake answers socratically. “Look closely, 
consider how it is different. God says it is fearful, but I say it is fascinating.”
Eve considers, peering at the tree intently. “What is different about it?” she asks herself. 
And before she knows it, something about the tree has grabbed her—its shapeliness, the blush 
of  its fruit, its mystery, its particular shade of  green. She stumbles, all at once, into a sensation 
of  delight. 
It is at this moment that delight makes its first appearance in the Garden. Surely, existence in 
the Garden is pleasant. Adam expresses his contentment as creation is completed, as the first 
human is divided into male and female.1 “At last,” he says, satisfied and relieved to have found 
a suitable companion.1 Contentment is the sense that things are as they should be. But delight 
is different: it arises without a specific task, role or imperative. One can never tell where it will 
come from, or where it will lead. Delight is not found through a careful weighing of  things; it 
rather hits unexpectedly, as a surprise, spurring us to think or act in some new way.   
Eve’s unexpected pleasure, her delight, does not fit in the Garden: it is excessive to the Garden’s 
equanimity. Its emergence marks a seismic change, as well as a momentous step for life. For as 
1  Trible finds textual evidence that the first “earth creature” is not male but presexual.
16  Robert Alter affirms the difficulty of translating the word used to describe Eve. It is often translated as “helper” (KJV) 
or “help-meet” (according to Alter), but Alter finds “sustainer” to be a more accurate translation. Robert Alter, ed. Genesis: 
Translation and Commentary, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 9.
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Elizabeth Grosz explains, the “opening up of  life to the indeterminacy of  taste, pleasure, and 
sensation”1 allows life to elaborate itself  in new ways. 
Following Darwin, Grosz affirms that the opening of  life to pleasure, and its unparalleled gener-
ative, elaborative, and productive effects, arises with the advent of  sexual difference. If  survival 
operates through a reductive framing, ordering, and exclusion of  the world’s resources and cha-
otic forces, then sexual selection—which emerges as life’s most successful means of  reproduction 
and diversification—complicates life by making provisional cuts back through survival’s order. It 
strategically rends the organism, allowing some measure of  chaos to enter in. It welcomes sensa-
tion, and orients toward self-differentiation, toward becoming-other. Its operations far exceed 
the narrow domain of  “reproduction,” permeating all of  life with their destabilizing influence. 
It invests itself  in performance, colour and form at great energetic expense in order to provoke 
sensation: Grosz calls it the becoming-artistic of  nature. In this way, forms of  sexual attraction 
and sexual selection make of  life “a fundamentally dynamic, awkward, mal-adaptation that 
enables the production of  the frivolous, the unnecessary, the pleasing, the sensory for their own 
sake.”1
There is sexual difference in the garden as soon as Adam and Eve are made, yet its effects are 
not immediately felt. This moment of  Eve’s unbidden delight awakens life to the transforma-
tive ramifications of  sexual difference: her pleasure sets in motion life’s great dynamic. It is the 
impact of  the force of  her delight that sets the world trembling, that makes of  these first human 
beings human becomings. 
Questions of  obedience fall aside. Eve’s consumption of  the forbidden fruit, and her desire for 
wisdom, now appear to be late-coming forces in the bid to overthrow the Garden’s stability. For 
in her delight, Eve herself  has begun to shift, to feel out her own latencies in the living world 
around her. She is already becoming-tree, becoming-snake, becoming-fruit, becoming-green.
17  Elizabeth Grosz. Chaos, Territory, Art:: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth (New York, Columbia University Press, 2008), 
6. 
18  Ibid., 7. 
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[6] So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food,
As the narrator in Genesis relates, God made to grow in the Garden of  Eden every tree that is 
good for food. Then just before Eve eats from the tree of  knowledge, we are told again that she 
sees that the fruit of  this particular tree is good for food. The repetition in the story underlines 
that the tree of  the knowledge is like every tree, but it also highlights their difference: in the first 
case, God deems the fruit good, while in the second case the judge is Eve.
The species of  the tree of  the knowledge is not mentioned in Genesis, but there is a rich history 
of  speculation about what it might be. An apple is most commonly depicted as the forbidden 
fruit. However, contextual readers point out that apples are not native to the region where the 
story is thought to originate.19 As a literary device, on the other hand, the apple is appealing: its 
latin name, malum, is a heteronym for evil.20 Other fruits that are more appropriately indigenous 
to Eden’s mythological territory include the apricot, olive, grape, date, and the pomegranate.
The latter is a popular choice for its rosy skin, bloody juice and jewel-like, extravagantly-seeded 
flesh 
The fig, likewise, recommends itself  for the role. It is appropriately native, softly fleshy and 
sensual, and it carries an abundance of  seeds, making it suggestive of  fertility. It is perhaps a 
most obvious suggestion, because its tree is actually mentioned in the story. Also, as it ripens to 
inconspicuous greens, velvety pinks or restrained dark purples, one might call it a subtle fruit--
the same adjective that is used to describe Eden’s snake. The most subtle of  creatures might find 
in the fig a sympathetic accomplice.
The fig is Durer’s choice in his famous engraving of  the Fall, where compositional play and 
foreshadowing persuade us to give this fruit some consideration. He depicts the fig tree, hung 
with fruit and snake, at the centre of  the scene. Across its trunk an “X”—drawn by the lines 
of  Eve’s gaze and Adam’s gesture—organizes the frame. Eve gazes down toward the fruit, but 
19  Horace Jeffrey Hodges, “Forbidden Fruit as Impedimental Peach: A Scholarly ‘Pesher’ on Paradise Lost 9.80-82,” 
Milton and Early Modern English Studies, Volume 18, Number 2 (2008): 39-11, accessed 12 May 2011, http://www.dbpia.
co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/12726
20  Ibid.
experiment
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further along her line of  sight is a wisp of  forest that—for the moment at least—obligingly 
conceals Adam’s genitals. Adam’s innocent gesture toward Eve and the fruit traces out the op-
posite diagonal line of  the “X”, nonchalantly bringing our attention to her groin. Suspended 
here, Adam and Eve’s awareness of  their nakedness perches on the edge. Both figures face us 
frontally, the lines of  their bent legs reinforcing the composition while making them appear 
poised to step forward from the edge of  the forest, about to reveal themselves. In the distance, a 
goat gazes down comically from a precipitous mountain peak, as though considering the depth 
it might fall. 
Now as Eve reaches out for the fruit, an errant fig leaf  from a branch she has already plucked 
just so happens to float out over her body, guarding her modesty. It’s an artist’s trick, but it 
also hints compellingly at why we should consider the fig as the forbidden fruit: simply, Adam 
and Eve use fig leaves to cover themselves because they find the leaves immediately at hand. 
Proximity, after all, is the only quality that might recommend fig leaves as garments. They are, 
as Durer renders them, deeply lobed, and generally not very large. Their surface is scratchy. 
Had Adam and Eve gone hunting in the garden, they might have found any number of  more 
substantial and suitable kinds of  leaves. One would choose fig leaves for clothing only in a mo-
ment of  panic: such as the moment when, with the fruit’s sweet flesh sliding down the throat, 
there is a sudden dawning of  what it is to feel naked and ashamed.
12
The fig is the subtlest of  fruits: it grows with a riddle. We know that all fruiting plants must 
produce flowers which, when pollinated, produce fruit and seeds. The fig is an enigma because 
it is a fruiting plant that does not appear to flower. Now many flowering plants, such as grapes, 
are said to have “inconspicuous flowers”—that is, flowers that are tiny and not showy—but 
the fig (genus ficus) shows no flowers at all. The fig’s fruit simply emerges from the branch as a 
green droplet, where it swells and ripens: becoming soft and sweet and full of  seeds, sometimes 
darkening its skin. The key to the riddle of  the fig is that it does not come out in flower. What we 
see as the fig fruit is in fact a fleshy “inflorescence”: a vessel called a synconium that flowers-in.21 
The fig’s life story is remarkable.22,23 Beneath its skin, a young fig lines its inner walls with simple 
flowers that protrude toward a void at the centre. The flowers are of  two types: short-style and 
long-style. Entrapped in their little orb, they produce a scent that attracts the attention of  a tiny 
symbiotic wasp. 
The female fig wasp seeks out this fragrance alone. She struggles inside the fruit through the 
osticle, a minute hole at its base, usually losing her wings and tentacles on the way in.24 Once 
inside the fig, the wasp treads though the flowers, trying to deposit her eggs into the base of  each 
of  them. She succeeds in the short-style flowers: planting an egg inside each, she makes these 
flowers infertile for the fig, but the perfect incubator for her seed. In long-style (female) flowers, 
however, the wasp finds her ovipositor to be the wrong length, and cannot lay her eggs. But in 
her attempts, as she probes the depth of  each flower, she deposits pollen that has collected on 
her body onto the flower’s stigma. The result is that these flowers are pollinated, allowing them 
to ripen and produce seed. 
Inside the fig, the wasps die. Eggs incubate. Flowers ripen to seed. 
21 “The Story of the Fig and its Wasp,” Ecological Society of America, accessed 23 July 2012, http://www.esa.
org/esablog/field/the-story-of-the-fig-and-its-wasp/
22  “Interaction of figs and fig wasps,” accessed 23 July 2012, http://www.figweb.org/Interaction/index.htm
23  “Figs may have been the first domesticated crop,” Cosmos Magazine, accessed 23 July 2012, http://www.cosmosmagazine.
com/news/figs-may-have-been-first-domesticated-crop/ 
2  “The Story of the Fig and its Wasp”
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The male wasps hatch out of  their sacs first, and seek out females, fertilizing them before they 
emerge. Then the males work together to dig a tunnel out of  the fig to allow the females to es-
cape. Shortly afterward, the males die. The females hatch and follow them out, carrying pollen, 
and seeking out new young figs where they will lay their eggs. 
Different species of  fig rely on different species of  symbiotic wasp to make fertile their little 
internalised gardens, but all use this curious and complicated method of  reproduction.2 In ex-
change, the fig’s garden becomes the wasps’ bedchamber, shelter for the young, and sometimes 
their tomb. Some species of  fig go so far as to produce a specific crop of  fruit that is entirely 
infertile: its only function is to allow the wasps to overwinter and continue to reproduce. 
But beneath the fig’s skin, these remarkably intertwined sexualities lie hidden. Each fig fruit is its 
own hortus conclusus, or tiny walled garden. In Eden, each is a garden within the Garden.
2  I have made a number of simplifications in the details of fig and wasp mutualisms for the sake of brevity.  The specific 
contracts of mutualism vary somewhat among different species of fig and wasp. 
12
[6] So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food - 
There is no time in the Garden of  Eden: Adam and Eve are there for neither hours nor years. 
But the phrase “Eve saw that the tree was good for food” describes a rare moment that seems 
to take time. How does she see that the tree is good for food? I like to imagine the way that the 
hours stretch out. 
“You will not die,” the snake says. 
“Is this a trap?” Eve wonders, never having seen one before.
She picks the fruit gingerly and tentatively smells it. It is mildly sweet. She rubs it gently on 
the tender skin of  her forearm. She waits. She pricks the fruit to let a little juice ooze out and 
rubs it on her skin again. She waits, and waits. Nothing happens. 
But something has happened. Something has already changed, for determining whether the fig 
is edible requires an experiment in wilderness survival. If  this is Eden, how does Eve find herself  
confronting a wilderness? 
No matter: by now, the final casting-out from the garden is redundant. Wilderness, as it does in 
every garden, has already crept in. 
Eve touches the fig’s skin to her tongue and waits, puts a little of  the juice on her tongue and 
waits. She takes a tiny nibble. She waits. Nothing happens. She tears the fig in two--
The walls of  the fig’s garden are thrown open. In its centre is something Eden has never seen 
before: a cluster of  faded flowers. 
“How lovely,” Eve smiles, surprised to find inside the fruit, instead of  a hard stone, this soft 
void. “Who would have imagined that the inside of  a fig looked like that?”
Satisfied, she bites into the tender flesh. 
last days
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green :
- adjective
covered with herbage or foliage; verdant: green fields.
- verb
to become or make green
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On Prince Edward Island, the grain of  the farm is as familiar as the sky. Carefully-ordered 
cropland and pasture, cut with hedgerows, unrolls in serial waves along the roadsides. It is 
the landscape that defines this green island; but unless we are farmers, farms are spaces that 
we nearly never set foot in. Instead they are spaces that we inhabit only imaginatively from a 
distance, and often at high speeds through the window of  a car. 
Each farm field is a highly controlled and homogeneous space: a singular variety of  plant mul-
tiplied across a plane so that the whole field moves in a single temporal arc. The field is plowed 
and planted, it fills with green and thickens. Sometimes it develops a dusted bloom of  colour, 
or simply dries to shades of  gold. Large fields are as scaleless and sublime as inland seas. Then 
there is the harvest: all vegetation is cut and removed, or sometimes it is baled into identical, 
stout figures and scattered like buoys, giving the imagination a measure as it moves out across 
the plane. 
But for now it is August, and the fields of  grain are tall and dry, the soybean fields dense and 
deep. I pay a visit to the Experimental Farm, or Home Farm, tucked within the Island’s capital 
city. Embedded in this culture of  extensive agriculture, the Experimental Farm is a collection 
of  crop fields where varieties are cross-bred and grown-out in an open-air laboratory along 
tree-lined roads, interspersed with lawns, commemorative plaques and planted monuments. 
A clutch of  historic, white-washed buildings and greenhouses sits at its centre. It reads as a 
microcosm of  the Island’s landscape, a meta-farm among farms, or a theme park to the study of  
mainstream agricultural practice. Experimental varieties stand narrowly apart, while separate 
cropping areas are edged with wide margins of  mown grass. Beyond these margins are paved 
roads, or bands of  meadow plants that have been allowed to emerge along the formal pedestrian 
trails or hedgerows.
This farm is open to the public as a recreational space—at least its walking paths and lawns. The 
crops still stop us at their perimeter. There is also one field that has been left fallow: it is a thick, 
grassy meadow peppered with wildflowers.
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Set beside the carefully-cropped planes on the farm with their rigourous plantings of  grain and 
soybeans, the fallow field feels vastly out of  place. The planted fields are homogeneously thick 
and break off  sharply at their edges, but the fallow field is varied and frayed. Its edges blur into 
hedgerow and fencerow; or crumble out into established meadow and semi-maintained lawn. A 
well-travelled, informal footpath passes just inside or along or perhaps just beyond one margin. 
Some footfalls are stopped short and shallow by unseen rises of  earth, while others plunge 
deeply. And where the cropped field is impassibly dense and excludes wanderers, the position of  
the fallow field is indefinite. Without clear edges or any indication of  control, it is a provisionally 
navigable and diverse territory. 
At least, it seems so for now; for while the crop is a uniform array of  plants, all aligned in their 
cycle of  growth, maturity, and harvest, the fallow field churns in illegible and heterogeneous 
times, immersed in innumerable times. Today grasshoppers explode around each footstep like 
shrapnel, and are caught in the elaborate devices of  orb weavers. Today there are particular 
constellations of  yellow sow thistle and white Queen Anne’s lace, purple clover and crown 
vetch; but tomorrow a new set of  buds will reach their peak of  bloom, scattering new patterns 
over the field. 
It is unclear exactly when each of  these processes began, and as they slip back into the depth of  
the field they are overwritten by other beginnings and dispersed climaxes. It is also impossible to 
read when they may end. The logic of  the fallow field is simply to continue to begin, to elaborate 
itself  outward in time, unconscious of  any particular future. 
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I later visit an organic farmer outside of  town who talks about the expensive but effective prac-
tice of  sterilizing soil by steaming it. It is a method of  weed and pest control that can be used 
for high-return crops such as strawberries, he tells me. He has laid down sheets of  black plastic 
around the melon plants to keep down weeds, and also relies on hand-pulling. Controlling 
weeds and pests is a major thread in his story of  producing perfect foods for market. For the 
narrative of  productive farming separates, isolates, and evaluates, pursuing sharp edges in space 
and carving equally sharp edges in time. Crops are planted and there is the harvest; the harvest 
is good or bad, the fields are cleared, and crops are replanted. 
In this way, the fallow field stands wholly apart from the farm, even if  only temporarily so. It 
exists on the farm as an imposter, beside the smooth teleologies of  crop fields, perhaps always 
threatened or promised the eventual leveling effort of  a plough. But in the meantime, it is a 
wholly uncalculated bursting, a collection of  carelessly unfolding habitats, tiny elisions, diffuse 
climaxes. Fallowness is only an immediate condition. It does not consider a happily ever after. 
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